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Abstract
We investigate jointly the importance of contemporary country-level institutional struc-
tures and local ethnicity-speciﬁc pre-colonial institutions in shaping comparative regional
development in Africa. We utilize information on the spatial distribution of African ethnic-
ities before colonization and exploit within ethnicity (across countries) and within-country
(across ethnicities) regional variation in economic performance, as proxied by satellite light
density at night. The fact that political boundaries across the African landscape parti-
tioned ethnic groups in diﬀerent countries, thus subjecting identical cultures to diﬀerent
country-level institutions, oﬀers a regression discontinuity framework. After identifying
the partitioned ethnicities we document a positive cross-sectional association between na-
tional institutions and regional economic development. However, our ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects
speciﬁcations show that diﬀerences in countrywide institutional arrangements do not ex-
plain diﬀerences in regional economic performance within ethnic groups. In contrast, we
document that local ethnic traits proxied by tribal pre-colonial political institutions and
class stratiﬁcation exert even today a signiﬁcant eﬀect on regional development. The posi-
tive within country eﬀect of pre-colonial institutions also obtains in regions of partitioned
ethnicities along the national boundaries.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years there has been a surge of empirical research on the determinants of African
and more generally global under-development and state failures. The predominant institu-
tional view suggests that poorly performing national institutional structures, such as lack of
constraints on the executive and poor property rights protection, as well as ineﬃcient legal and
court systems are the ultimate causes of under-development (see Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002,
2005) on the former and La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) on the latter). This body of research puts
an emphasis on the impact of colonization on contemporary country-level institutions and in
turn on economic development. Yet many downplay the importance of colonial and contempo-
rary institutional structures in Africa. Recent works on weak and strong states emphasize the
limited state capacity of most African states and their inability to provide public goods, collect
taxes, and enforce contracts (Acemoglu (2005); Besley and Persson (2008, 2010)). The inability
of African governments to broadcast power outside the capital cities has led many inﬂuential
African scholars to highlight the role of pre-colonial ethnic-speciﬁc institutional and cultural
traits (Herbst (2000); Boone (2003)). They argue that the presence of the Europeans in Africa
was (with some exceptions) quite limited both regarding timing and location. As a result of
the negligible penetration of Europeans in the mainland and the poor network infrastructure
that has endured after independence, it is local tribal level, rather than national institutional
structures, that shape African development.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the determinants of African development
entering precisely this debate; we tackle two distinct, though inter-related, questions. First, do
contemporaneous nationwide institutions aﬀect economic performance across regions once we
account for hard-to-observe ethnicity-speciﬁc traits, culture, and geography? Second, do pre-
colonial institutional and societal ethnic characteristics correlate with regional development
once we consider country-level attributes, like economic/institutional performance, national
post-independence policies, and geography?
In contrast to most previous works that have relied on cross-country data and meth-
ods, we tackle these questions exploiting within-country and within-ethnicity regional variation
across approximately 1200 African ethnic regions. We utilize data from the pioneering work
of Murdock (1959, 1967), who through extensive ﬁeld work has produced a map portraying
the spatial distribution of ethnicities (Figure 1) as well as quantitative information on the
economy, institutions, and cultural traits for many ethnic groups before the European colo-
nization of Africa. To overcome the paucity of regional data across African ethnicities, we
follow Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2009) and measure regional economic development at
the ethnicity-country level using satellite data on light density at night, which are available at
1av e r yﬁne disaggregation.
Figure 1: Ethnic Boundaries Figure 1: Ethnic and Country Boundaries
We start our analysis examining the impact of contemporary national institutions on
economic performance. In line with cross-country studies, we ﬁnd a strong positive correlation
between rule of law (or control of corruption) and luminosity across African ethnic regions. Yet
due to omitted variables and other potential sources of endogeneity this correlation does not
imply a causal relationship. To isolate the one-way eﬀect of contemporaneous institutions on
regional development we exploit diﬀerences in country-level institutional quality within ethnic-
ities partitioned by national boundaries, as identiﬁed by intersecting Murdock’s ethnolinguistic
map with the Digital Chart of the World (Figure 1).
The artiﬁcial design of borders in Africa, which took place in European capitals in the
late 19th century (mainly in the Berlin Conference in 1884 − 5 and subsequent treaties in the
1890), well before independence and when Europeans had hardly settled in the regions whose
borders were designing, oﬀers a nice (quasi)-experimental setting to address this question.1
The drawing of political boundaries partitioned in the eve of African independence more than
200 ethnic groups, thus subjecting identical cultures to diﬀerent country-level institutions.
Taking advantage of this historical accident, we compare economic performance in regions
belonging to the historical homeland of the same ethnic group, but being subject to diﬀerent
1There is no ambiguity among African scholars and historians that almost all of African borders were artiﬁ-
cially drawn. For example, the borders of Congo and of the other Central African countries were designed before
Europeans even sent missionaries to explore the area. Huillery (2009) shows that the French did not respect
ethnicities’ homelands when designing the administrative areas of French West Africa.
2contemporary national institutions. The regression discontinuity (RD) approach allows us to
account for geography, the disease environment, and other ecological features at a very ﬁne level
(see Dell (2009)). By comparing development in adjacent border regions which belong to the
historical homeland of the same ethnic group (see Figures 2 − 2 for examples), allows us to
control eﬀectively for culture and other ethnic-speciﬁc traits. Our results show that there is no
systematic relationship between country-wide diﬀerences in institutions and regional economic
performance within partitioned ethnicities Africa.
Figure 2 Figure 2
Figure 2 Figure 2
We then turn our focus on the economic impact of pre-colonial tribal institutions and
societal arrangements. Our analysis establishes that political centralization and statehood
experience before the advent of European colonizers correlates signiﬁcantly with contemporary
development. The same pattern applies to class stratiﬁcation, a societal trait that has been
linked to property rights protection (e.g. Rudmin (1995); Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin,
and Robinson (2008)). The strong positive correlation between ethnic pre-colonial institutions
3(and class stratiﬁcation) and regional development prevails when we account at a very ﬁne level
for the disease environment, land suitability for agriculture and elevation among others. Pre-
colonial ethnic institutions correlate signiﬁcantly with regional development even when we solely
utilize the within country variation, so as to account for unobserved country-level attributes.
We also ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of local institutions on regional development persists across
ethnic groups partitioned by the national boundaries. This suggests that along these territories
characterized by the negligible penetration of countrywide policies it is the tribal institutions,
determined well before the colonial era, that shape contemporary development.
Related Literature Our research nests and advances over many strands of literature
that examine the historical roots of economic development in Africa and elsewhere. First, an
inﬂuential body of research asserts that through persistence, the institutions that European
powers established in the eve of colonization are the deep roots of contemporary development.
While there is ambiguity on the exact mechanisms via which colonization aﬀected African (and
more generally non-European) development, there is an agreement that the type of colonization
and the identity of the colonizing power had long-lasting eﬀects on institutional development
(e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002); La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999); Alcalá and Ciccone
(2004); Glaeser, Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004); see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005) for a review). Yet in spite of the ingenious instrumental variables identiﬁcation schemes
employed in the cross-country literature, it is always hard to pin down the exact mechanism.
This is because colonization might aﬀect development via channels other than the institutional
legacy and because omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity are always major concerns
in cross-country approaches.2
Our regional focus adds to a vibrant body of research that takes a micro approach
examining the within-country impact of institutions (e.g. Banerjee and Iyer (2005); Iyer (2010);
Dell (2009); Huillery (2009); see Acemoglu and Dell (2008) and La-Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (2010) for recent evidence across administrative regions within countries). Our
identiﬁcation scheme on the impact of the national institutions explores discontinuities across
the border within partitioned ethnicities. A deﬁning characteristic of the empirical design is
that it keeps all ethnicity-speciﬁc factors constant. This is key as recent works have shown that
traits related to culture, social capital and genetic distance/diversity correlate signiﬁcantly
with economic and institutional development even within countries (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza, and
2For example, La Porta et al. (2008) argue, one should be cautious when using legal origin indicators to
instrument legal institutions, because the legal tradition has also shaped regulation, state involvement in the
economy, and the polity (see also Nunn (2009) and Pande and Udry (2006) on this point). Huillery (2009) for
example, using administrative data from former French West Africa shows a signiﬁcant eﬀect of colonization on
contemporary development working through early colonial investments.
4Zingales (2008); Tabellini (2010); Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009); Ashraf and Galor (2008)).3
Our results suggest that it may be premature to conclude from cross-sectional studies that a
higher degree of countrywide rule of law and a lower level of corruption translate to higher
levels of regional development in Africa.
Second, our ﬁndings advance the literature on the importance of pre-colonial institutional
and cultural features in African development (Herbst (2000); Bates (1981, 1983); Boone (2003);
see Robinson (2002) for a critical review). Anthropologists have shown that there were marked
diﬀerences in institutional and social traits across African regions at the time of colonization
(Murdock (1959, 1967)). There were noteworthy diﬀerences on political centralization, land
rights, and the power of local chiefs, among others. As colonizers did not expand their power in
remote areas far from the capital cities and the coastline, such local institutions were preserved
and were instrumental even during the half century period of colonial rule (roughly 1890 −
1940). Moreover, many African case studies stress the ongoing crucial role of ethnic institutions
and traditions (e.g. Dowden (2008)). Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) use ethnicity-level data
from Murdock’s Ethnolinguistic Atlas (1967) on how centralized ethnic groups were before
colonization, and construct a country-level measure of political centralization which is shown
to be positively correlated with various proxy measures of economic development (see also
Englebert (2000)).
The African historiography has proposed many channels on why ethnic institutions still
matter. Gennaioli and Rainer (2006) and Boone (2003) argue that in centralized societies there
is a high degree of political accountability of local chiefs. Others have argued that centralized
societies were quicker in adopting growth enhancing Western technologies and habits, because
the colonizers collaborated more strongly with politically and socially complex ethnic groups
(Schapera (1956, 1970)). Herbst (2000) and Migdal (1988) stress the role of ethnic class strati-
ﬁcation and political centralization in establishing well-deﬁned and secure land rights (see also
Golstein and Udry (2008)). Furthermore, complex tribal societies with strong political institu-
tions seem to have been more successful in getting concessions both from colonial powers and
from national governments after independence.
We improve upon this body of research by showing that pre-colonial institutions ex-
ert a positive eﬀect on regional development even when we control for local geography and
most importantly when we condition on country ﬁxed-eﬀects. Accounting for common to all
ethnicities country factors is central, as Gennaioli and Rainer (2006) show a positive cross-
3There is a large literature in education, urban and trade economics that concentrates on bordering regions
to investigate the eﬀect of various policies (e.g. Holmes (1998), McCallum (1995), Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh,
and Li (2010) among others). The rationale is that focusing on adjacent regions, while accounting for observable
characteristics, should neutralize any local unobservable diﬀerences that would otherwise contaminate inference.
5country correlation between ethnic-speciﬁc institutional indicators and current measures of in-
stitutional development; thus is not clear from the cross-country evidence whether pre-colonial
local structures and/or nationwide institutions aﬀect current economic performance. Moreover,
controlling for geography at a ﬁne level is essential as studies on African institutional devel-
opment argue that pre-colonial political centralization was driven by the suitability of land
for agriculture, population density, and other geographic features (e.g. Bates (1981); Fenske
(2009)). Our results oﬀer strong support to those emphasizing the importance of pre-colonial
ethnicity-speciﬁc institutions in current times. In this regard they are in line with recent em-
pirical studies showing that historically determined socioeconomic and political factors have
persistent eﬀects on comparative development (examples include the forced labor practices of
Spanish colonizers in Peru (Dell (2009)); the formation of city-states in Italy during the late
period of the Middle Ages (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008)); 19th century inequality in
Colombia (Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin, and Robinson (2008)); the type of colonization and
early inequality in Brazil (Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção (2009)); the type of the colonial tax
system in Nigeria (Berger (2009); see Nunn (2009) for a review).
The uncovered evidence on the limited eﬀect of national institutions on regional devel-
opment relates to works on state capacity (e.g. Tilly (1985); Migdal (1988); Acemoglu (2005);
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2009); Besley and Persson (2008, 2010)). Likewise, the ﬁnding
that the positive correlation between national institutions and regional development weakens in
border areas has implications for the literature on the optimal country formation (e.g. Alesina
and Spolaore (2003); Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005)).
Finally, this study contributes to a large body of work on the roots of contemporary
African development. Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Puga (2010) stress the importance of the
slave trade, while Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2010) and Englebert, Tarango, and Carter
(2002) show a signiﬁcant negative impact on development of improper border design and state
artiﬁciality. A natural message coming out from our analysis is that research which aims to
understand regional development in Africa needs to focus on the ethnicity level rather than the
country level. In this regard our work is related to recent country-speciﬁc studies that stress
the role of local chiefs in the provision of public goods in Africa (Miguel and Gugerty (2005);
Franck and Rainer (2009); Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg (2010)).
Paper Structure In the next section we discuss the luminosity data that we use
to proxy regional development and present the pre-colonial ethnic institutional measures. In
section 3 we detail our econometric methodology. We present the regression discontinuity
design and discuss estimation and inference. Section 4 reports our main results on the eﬀect
6of contemporary national institutions and pre-colonial ethnic institutional features on regional
development. Section 5 provides further evidence. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2D a t a
2.1 Data on partitioning
The starting point in compiling our dataset is George Peter Murdock’s (1959) Ethnolinguistic
map that reports the spatial distribution of ethnicities across Africa. Using extensive ﬁeld work
and other resources, Murdock explicitly tried to map ethnicities before (or around) European
colonization in the mid/late 19th century. Murdock’s map (reproduced in Figure 1) includes
843 tribal areas (the mapped ethnicities correspond roughly to levels 7−8 of the Ethnologue’s
language family tree); yet 8 areas are classiﬁed as uninhabited upon colonization and are
therefore not considered in our analysis.4 One may wonder how much the spatial distribution
of ethnicities across the continent has changed over the past 100−150 years. Reassuringly, using
individual data from the Afrobarometer Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) show a strong correlation
(around 062) between the location of the respondents in 2005 and the historical homeland of
their ethnicity as identiﬁed in Murdock’s (1959) map. In the same vein, Glennerster, Miguel,
and Rothenberg (2010) document that following the massive displacement that took place
during the 1991 − 2002 civil war in Sierra Leone there has been a systematic movement of
individuals towards the areas of their ethnic group’s historical homeland. In fact, in rural areas
the historical ethnic diversity strongly predicts current diversity, with a coeﬃcient estimate of
080.
We project on top of Murdock’s ethnolinguistic map the Digital Chart of the World (Fig-
ure 1) that portrays contemporary national boundaries. This allows to identify in a systematic
way partitioned ethnicities across Africa. Appendix Table 1 reports split groups, deﬁned as
groups where at least 10% of their historical homeland belongs to more than one contemporary
states. Our procedure identiﬁes most major ethnic groups that have been separated by African
borders. For example, the Maasai were partitioned between Kenya and Tanzania (shares 62%
and 38% respectively), the Anyi between Ghana and the Ivory Coast (shares 58% and 42%),
and the Chewa between Mozambique (50%), Malawi (34%), and Zimbabwe (16%). We also
checked whether our codiﬁcation of partitioned ethnicities is in line with Asiwaju (1985), who
provides the only (to our knowledge) codiﬁcation of split ethnicities in Africa. Our strategy
identiﬁes almost all ethnic groups that Asiwaju (1985) lists as partitioned.
4In the empirical analysis we also eliminate the Guanche, a small group in the Madeira islands that is currently
part of Spain.
72.2 Satellite Light Density at Night
The nature of our study requires detailed data on economic development at the grid level. To the
best of our knowledge, geocoded high resolution measures of economic development spanning
Africa are not readily available. To overcome this issue we follow Henderson, Storeygard, and
Weil (2009) and use satellite data on light density at night to proxy for local economic activity.
Data come from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan
System (DMSP-OLS) that reports images of the earth at night captured from 20:00 to 21:30
local time from an altitude of 830 km. The satellite detects lights from human settlements, ﬁres,
gas ﬂares, heavily lit ﬁshing boats, lightning, and the aurora. The measure is a six-bit (0−63)
digital number calculated for every 30-second area pixel (approximately 1 square kilometer).
The resulting data are a series of annual composite images. These are created by overlaying all
images captured during a calendar year, dropping images where lights are shrouded by cloud
cover or overpowered by the aurora or solar glare (near the poles), and removing ephemeral
lights (like ﬁres, lightning and other noise). The result is a series of global images of time stable
night lights.5 Using these data we construct average light density per square kilometer for 2007
and 2008 at the desired level of aggregation (ethnicity-country).6 We do so by averaging across
pixels that fall within the historical homeland of each ethnic group in each country (using the
median value yields similar results).
This high resolution dataset makes the data uniquely suited to spatial analyses of eco-
nomic development in Africa for many reasons. First, most African countries have low quality
income statistics, even at the national level.7 Second, we lack data on regional income or value
added for many African countries. And while there are some regional proxies of poverty and
health (see Young (2009)), these data do not map to our ethnicity level unit of analysis. Third,
by using light density we also capture the economic activities of the underground economy,
which are not reﬂected in the aggregate statistics. As the share of the shadow economy is
high in Africa (e.g. La-Porta and Shleifer (2008)), the usage of luminosity data is particularly
5See Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2009), Min (2008), Chen and Nordhaus (2010) and the references
therein for technical details on measurement error of the light data. Satellite data on lights are subject to
overglow or blooming, which means that lights tend to appear larger than they actually are, especially for bright
lights and over water and snow. Thus, water area is a standard control. Many of these issues, however are less
pressing within Africa since there are few instances of top-coding, no long summer nights and no snow.
6We use the mean value of the last two available observations (in 2007 and 2008)t oa v e r a g eo u ta n ye ﬀect
from variation in cloudiness and other weather conditions. The correlation between light intensity in 2007 and
2008 is greater than 095 and thus all our results go through if we use either the 2007 or the 2008 values.
7For example, the codebook of the Penn World Tables assigns the lowest two scores (out of four possible
ratings) on data quality for all African countries. Actually, one may reasonably argue that light density is a su-
perior measure of economic activity, due to problems in measuring output and prices across African countries (see
Deaton and Heston (2010); Ciccone and Jarocinski (2010); Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou, and Subramanian
(2009)).
8desirable in our setting.
Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2009) show that light density at night provides a
good proxy of economic activity. They also establish a strong within-country correlation (both
across time and across regions) between light density at night and GDP and consumption.
Moreover, there is a strong association between luminosity and access to electricity and public
goods provision, especially among low income countries (see Elvidge, Baugh, Kihn, Kroehl,
and Davis (1997) and Min (2008)). As one of the main eﬀects of institutions on development
is via the provision of public goods, such as electriﬁcation, the use of the light density data
allows us to directly assess this channel.
In Figures 3 and 3 we examine whether luminosity correlates with development across
African countries. Figure 3 illustrates the unconditional correlation between log light density
and log GDP per capita in 2000. There is a clear positive relationship. The 2 is 035 and the
p o i n te s t i m a t ei sm o r et h a n6 standard errors larger than zero. Besides economic performance,
light density also reﬂects urbanization. Figure 3 shows the relationship between log GDP
per capita and log light density after partialling out the eﬀect of log population density. The
relationship between log light density and log GDP per capita becomes now even stronger (the
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Figure 3
We also examined the correlation between satellite light density and infant mortality, as
an alternative proxy measure of development, across 264 African regions.8 Figures 4 and 4
illustrate the negative correlation between log light density and infant mortality. The estimate
is −944 with a t-stat of 9; when we condition on log population density, the estimate increases
in absolute value (−1489) retaining its signiﬁcance at the 99% conﬁdence level.
8The data on regional infant mortality come from the Center for International Earth Science Information Net-
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Figure 4
The uncovered robust association between luminosity and development across African
countries and regions suggests that in absence of direct measures of regional economic perfor-
mance, light density is an informative proxy of local economic conditions.9
2.3 Ethnic Institutional Traits
In work following the mapping of the spatial distribution of African ethnicities, Murdock (1967)
produced an Ethnographic Atlas (published in the anthropological journal Ethnology)t h a t
coded around 70 variables, capturing cultural, geographical, and economic characteristics of
1270 ethnicities around the world. We assigned the 835 African ethnicities of Murdock’s
Map of 1959 to the ethnic groups in his Ethnolinguistic Atlas of 1967. As the two sources do
not always use the same name for identifying ethnic groups we employed several sources and
the updated version of Murdock’s Atlas produced by J. Patrick Gray to match a total of 534
ethnicities.
We extract from this database two indicators proxying pre-colonial ethnicity-speciﬁc
traits. First, following Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007), we proxy pre-colonial political insti-
tutions using Murdock’s (1967) index of "Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the Local Community
Level". This is an ordered variable, ranging from 0 to 4, that describes the number of polit-
ical jurisdictional hierarchies above the local community level for each society. A zero score
indicates stateless societies “lacking any form of centralized political organization.” Scores 1
and 2 designate petty and larger-paramount chiefdoms, while 3 and 4 indicate groups that are
part of large organized states. Murdock (1967) explicitly excludes colonial regimes (such as
protectorates) and attempts to capture political centralization/complexity before Europeans
started the settlement of Africa. Figure 5 illustrates the signiﬁcant heterogeneity in political
9Even Chen and Nordhaus (2010) who are skeptical on the use of luminosity data to proxy GDP, argue that
satellite light density is quite useful for countries with low quality statistics.
10centralization across African groups. Examples of large ethnicities without any level of polit-
ical organization above the local (village) level include the Bura and the Lango in Uganda.
Examples of tribes belonging to small chiefdoms are the Mende in Sierra Leone and the Ibo
of Nigeria. The Mbundu in Angola and the Zerma in Niger are part of large paramount chief-
doms, while the Yoruba in Nigeria and the Mossi in Burkina Faso are societies that were parts
of large states before colonization. Since there are only 4 groups classiﬁed as being part of large
complex states, i.e. have a score of 4, the Bubi in Equatorial Guinea, the Kafa in Ethiopia,
and the Beduin Arabs in Morocco and Tunisia, these are merged with those tribes that are
classiﬁed as being part of states i.e. get a score of 3.10
Second, we use Murdock’s (1967) class stratiﬁcation index. This is an ordered index that
captures "t h ed e g r e eo fc l a s sd i ﬀerentiation, excluding purely political and religious statuses".
As c o r eo f0 indicates "absence of signiﬁcant class distinctions among freemen"As c o r eo f1
suggests the presence of "wealth distinctions, which however have not crystallized into distinct
and hereditary social classes."S c o r e s2 and 3 indicate elite stratiﬁcation and a dual/aristocratic
stratiﬁcation respectively. The index takes the maximum value of 4 when "complex stratiﬁcation
into social classes correlated in large measure with extensive diﬀerentiation of occupational
statuses."11 Figure 5 plots class stratiﬁcation. As with the jurisdictional hierarchy measure,
there was signiﬁcant heterogeneity in societal structure across Africa at the time of colonization.
Highly stratiﬁed societies include the Yoruba and the Nupe in Nigeria, while examples of
ethnicities without wealth or elite distinctions are the Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania, the
Chewa in Malawi, and the Songo in Angola.
10T h i sh a sn oe ﬀect in the results. Following Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) we also construct and use
a binary political centralization index that equals one when the jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level
takes on the value of 2, 3,o r4 and zero when the jurisdictional hierarchy index equals 0 or 1.
11Results are similar if as Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007), we classify societies in two groups: those that
have no class distinctions, i.e. the class stratiﬁcation takes on the value of 0 and societies characterized by some
some type of class diﬀerentiation.
11Figure 5 Figure 5
2.4 National Institutions
For national institutions we rely on World Bank’s Governance Matters Database (Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005)). The World Bank assembles numerous de facto institutional
quality measures (originally compiled by various non-governmental organizations and risk as-
sessment agencies) and aggregates them into six main categories via a principal component
analysis, so as to minimize measurement error. For our benchmark estimates we use the rule
of law index that reﬂects the eﬀectiveness of the judiciary and the quality of property rights
protection. As many studies on African development focus on graft, we also report results
using the control of corruption index. Both variables have a theoretical minimum and maxi-
mum of −25 and +25, with higher values indicating better functioning institutions and less
corruption.12 In our sample the countries with the minimum values in rule of law are Somalia
(−191) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (−184), while Namibia (064) and Botswana
(071) are the most institutionally developed countries. Table 1-Panel  reports descriptive
statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis.
12Results are qualitatively similar if we use alternative measures of national institutions, like ICRG risk of




Our analysis on the relationship between contemporary national and pre-colonial ethnic in-
stitutions and regional development in Africa is based on variants of the following empirical
speciﬁcation:
 = 0 +  +  + 0
Φ +  + ()+[  + ]+ (1)
The dependent variable, , is the level of local economic activity in the historical
homeland of ethnic group  in country , as proxied by light density at night. For ethnicities
that fall into more than one country, each area of the partitioned group is assigned to the
corresponding country . For example, regional light density in the part of the Ewe in Ghana
is matched to the rule of law value of Ghana, while the adjacent region of the Ewe in Togo is
assigned the value of the rule of law in Togo.  denotes local ethnic institutions, as
reﬂected in the degree of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level and class stratiﬁcation.
Since the correlation between luminosity and proxies of development strengthens when we
condition for urbanization in many speciﬁcations we control for log population density ()
though population density is likely endogenous to national or/and ethnic institutional develop-
ment. Moreover, when we control for population density the regression estimates capture the
relationship between institutions and economic development per capita.
A potential merit of our regional focus is that we can account properly for local geography.
This is non-trivial as there is a ﬁerce debate in the literature on the institutional origins of
development on whether the strong correlation between institutional and economic development
is driven by geographical features (such as distance from the sea, land fertility), the disease
environment, or endowments (see for example Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999), Easterly
and Levine (2003)). Our cross-regional analysis allows us to account for geographic diﬀerences
at a ﬁne level (as compared to cross-country studies). In many speciﬁcations we include a rich
set of geographic controls, ,r e ﬂecting land endowments (elevation, total surface area, area
under water) and ecological features (malaria stability index, suitability for agriculture). The
Data Appendix gives detailed variable deﬁnitions and sources.
Crucially, we also introduce a cubic geographic polynomial (())i nd i s t a n c eo f
the centroid of each ethnic group  in country  from the capital city and distance from the
closest sea coast (see also Dell (2009)).13 As most contemporary capital cities in Africa were
13Letting  denote distance from the capital city and  denote distance from the closest sea coast, the poly-
nomial becomes  +  + 
2 + 




2. In the previous version of the paper we simply
controlled for distance from the capital and distance from the sea ﬁnding similar results. We also experimented
13established by Europeans during the colonial period, distance from the capital captures the
impact of colonization and the limited penetration of national institutions due to the poor
infrastructure (we formally explore this possibility below).14 In the same spirit, and besides
capturing the eﬀect of trade, distance to the sea coast reﬂects contact with Europeans and
therefore also the penetration of colonization. This is because during the colonial era (and the
slave trades) Europeans mainly settled in coastal areas. The joint inclusion of the geographic
polynomial (())a n dt h ec o u n t r yﬁxed-eﬀects () or ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects ()m a k e s
the above speciﬁcation a regression discontinuity (RD) type of analysis at the spatial dimension
(we discuss the validity of the RD design in the next section). As the areas of the same ethnic
group across the two (or more) countries share a common border, one could think of the within
ethnicity approach as a "matching estimator" with regions matched to neighboring regions.
3.2 Technical Remarks
Before presenting the results, we discuss some technical issues regarding estimation and in-
ference. First, a signiﬁcant fraction of the observations on regional development takes on the
value of zero. A zero level of light density occurs either because the area is extremely sparsely
populated without any electricity or because the satellite sensors cannot capture dimly lit
areas.15 Out of the 1218 observations there are 356 country-tribe areas with zero light den-
sity. In order not to lose these observations in the LS estimation we use as the dependent
variable the log of light density adding one ( ≡ ln(1 + )). Since this trans-
formation is not ideal, in our sensitivity analysis we estimate speciﬁcations ignoring unlit areas
( ≡ ln()) which is normally distributed. Looking at the "intensive margin"
also guarantees that we investigate the role of institutions in explaining variation in economic
performance across densely populated regions displaying non-trivial economic activity.16
Second, the dependent variable is highly skewed as besides the zeros, we have many
observations close to zero and a few extreme observations in the right tail of the distribution.
While the mean of satellite light density is 0198 the median is more than ten times smaller,
0018. This occurs because there are a few areas where light density is extremely high. For
with a second order and a fourth order polynomial ﬁnding similar results. We preferred the cubic polynomial
because in almost all speciﬁcations all terms enter with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
14Herbst (2000; pp. 16) emphatically notes that "rather systematically, Europeans created capitals that moved
power toward the ocean and away from the interior centers of power that Africans had slowly created". Herbst
lists many examples where colonizers decided to ignore local needs and established capital cities outside preex-
isting polities. As extreme examples he lists Mauritania and Bechunaland (Botswana) that were ruled during
colonization by capitals outside their nominal territories (Saint-Louis and Mafeking, respectively). Moving the
location of the capital was a key question for African leaders at independence. Yet with a few exceptions
(Tanzania, Malawi, and Nigeria), most countries did not relocate the capital city.
15Note that we exclude from the analysis tribe-country observations with zero population density in 2000.
16Dimly lit areas have an average population density of 2337 people per square kilometer whereas regions
with positive light density have an average of 5118.
14example, we have 65 observations (5%) where log light density exceeds 1 and 13 observations
(1%) where log light density exceeds 2. Thus in all tables we report trimmed speciﬁcations
ignoring the upper 2% of the distribution of the dependent variable (  (98)).17 Moreover,
since linear models might not be appropriate for "corner-solution" speciﬁcations where a sig-
niﬁcant mass of the non-negative observations is (close to) zero, we also report speciﬁcations
with Poisson ML (Wooldridge (2002)). The Poisson estimator is appealing, because it does not
require log-linearizing the dependent variable and thus preserves the higher moments of the
distribution, (see Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Silva, Tenreyro, and Windmeijer (2010)).18
In the previous version of the paper we also reported Tobit estimates that also account for
censoring in the dependent variable. The Tobit speciﬁcations (not shown for brevity) deliver
quite similar and if anything stronger results.
Third, in all speciﬁcations we report standard errors based on two-way clustering. We
use the approach of Miller, A.Cameron, and Gelbach (2006) and cluster standard errors both at
the country-level and at the ethnic-family level.19 This accounts for two main concerns related
to non-adjusted (or heteroskedasticity-adjusted) standard errors. First, within each country
we have many ethnicities where the country-level rule of law and the corruption measures take
the same value and thus clustering at the country-level is required (Moulton (1986)). Likewise,
partitioned ethnicities appear more than one time in our sample and thus clustering at the
ethnic family accounts for unobserved features within each ethnolinguistic cluster.20 Moreover,
as we report speciﬁcations using on the RHS tribal indicators that exhibit within ethnic family
correlation, it is appropriate to also cluster standard errors at the ethnic-family level. Sec-
ond, the multi-way clustering method accounts for arbitrary residual correlation within both
dimensions and thus accounts for spatial correlation (Miller, A.Cameron, and Gelbach (2006)
explicitly cite spatial correlation as an application of the multi-clustering approach). We also
estimated models with one-way clustering of standard errors (at either dimension) as well as
standard errors accounting for spatial correlation of an unknown form using Conley’s (1999)
method. The two-way clustering produces the largest in absolute value standard errors and thus
yields the most conservative inference. Moreover, as in many speciﬁcations we include country
or ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects this soaks up further the spatial correlation at each dimension.
17The results are similar if we trim the dependent variable at the 5% or 1%. We also estimated speciﬁcations
winsorizing the dependent variable at the top 1%, 2%,a n d5% ﬁnding similar results. To account for outliers
we also estimated median regressions, ﬁnding similar (and if anything stronger) results.
18Since there is no evidence of overdispersion in the dependent variable, i.e. mean and variance of light density
are 020 and 027 respectively, the Poisson estimator is preferred over negative binomial (though using the latter
yields similar results).
19Murdock assigns the 835 groups into 96 ethnolinguistic clusters/families.
20Clustering at the ethnicity level rather than at the ethnic family level produces similar standard errors. We
prefer to cluster at the broader ethnic family level, because the consistency of the standard errors improves with
the number of within cluster observations (Cameron, et al. (2006)).
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4.1 Preliminary Evidence
Table 2 reports cross-sectional speciﬁcations that associate regional development with contem-
porary national and pre-colonial ethnic institutions. Panel  presents LS results, while Panel
 reports Poisson ML estimates. Column (1) shows that there is a positive and signiﬁcant
correlation between the rule of law index and regional development. In column (2) we add the
RD polynomial on distance of the centroid of each ethnicity from the capital city and distance
from the closest sea coast (()). While all polynomial terms enter with signiﬁcant coef-
ﬁcients, the estimate on rule of law retains its economic and statistical signiﬁcance. In columns
(3) and (4) we control for population density and geography. Conditioning on geography re-
duces the coeﬃcient by 20% in the LS speciﬁcations and by 25% in the Poisson.21 Yet the
estimate retains signiﬁcance at standard conﬁdence levels. Overall, the correlations in (1)-(4)
echo the ﬁndings of cross-country works; although the association between institutional qual-
ity and development weakens somewhat when one accounts for geography, it remains highly
signiﬁcant.
In columns (5) to (8) we associate regional development with ethnic pre-colonial insti-
tutions, as reﬂected in the jurisdictional hierarchy measure (the results are similar with the
class stratiﬁcation index). Column (5) reports unconditional estimates. The coeﬃcient on the
proxy of early local institutions is positive and signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level (in both
LS and Poisson). Including the RD polynomial, population density, and the set of geographic
controls (in columns (6)-(8)) has a moderate eﬀect on the results. Although, the estimate drops
when we control for population density and geography (elevation, malaria, land’s suitability for
agriculture, surface area, and area under water), it remains at least two standard errors above
zero in all permutations.
In columns (9)-(12) we regress regional light density on both national and ethnic insti-
tutions. Given the positive correlation (016) between rule of law and jurisdictional hierarchy,
this is useful so as to investigate the stability of the results in columns (1)-(8). Column (9)
introduces both the rule of law index and the jurisdictional hierarchy measure. The uncondi-
tional LS estimate of rule of law in the sample of 669 ethnicity-country observations is 01395
(speciﬁcation not shown). Once we control for the degree of jurisdictional hierarchy the es-
timate on rule of law retains its signiﬁcance but falls by around 10% − 15%.L i k e w i s e t h e
21Most of the geographic controls enter with signiﬁcant estimates. The malaria stability index enters in most
speciﬁcations with a statistically signiﬁcant negative estimate. The coeﬃcients on land area under water and
suitability for agriculture are positive and in many speciﬁcations statistically signiﬁcant. Elevation enters with
a negative estimate, which is signiﬁcant in some models. Yet when we include the regression discontinuity (RD)
polynomial the explanatory power of the geography controls diminishes substantially.
16coeﬃcient on jurisdictional hierarchy is positive and highly signiﬁcant, though its magnitude
is somewhat smaller compared to the analogous speciﬁcation in (5). A similar pattern obtains
when we include in the speciﬁcation the RD polynomial, population density, and the set of
geographic-ecological controls (in (10)-(12)).
The LS coeﬃcient in column (12) implies that a one point increase in the rule of law
index (moving approximately from the institutional quality level of Angola to that of Gabon)
is associated with a 12% increase in regional development. The Poisson coeﬃcient in column
(12) implies that a one point increase in rule of law (two standard deviations) is associated
with higher light density of 076 points (approximately 15 standard deviations; see Table 1-
Panel ). Turning now to the eﬀect of pre-colonial institutions, the most conservative LS
estimate (00406) implies that regional development increases by approximately 12% as one
moves from areas where stateless societies reside to regions with ethnic groups featuring strong
pre-colonial institutions (i.e. have a jurisdictional hierarchy index equal to 3). The Poisson
estimates suggest that a one point increase in the jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local
community index (approximately one standard deviation) is associated with an increase in
light density of 024 points (half a standard deviation). The preliminary results in Table 2 are
informative about the broad data patterns. Yet these estimates do not identify the one way
eﬀect of neither contemporary national institutions nor ethnic historical institutional traits on
regional development.
4.2 National Institutions and Regional Development
Identifying the causal impact of contemporary institutions on regional comparative develop-
ment is a particularly demanding task; this is because, among other challenges, there are rarely
otherwise identical cultures exposed to diﬀerent institutional settings. Yet the arbitrary design
of borders in Africa oﬀers an ideal setting to isolate the eﬀect of nationwide institutions from
cultural traits and ethnic institutional norms.
There is signiﬁcant variation in both the rule of law across African countries (Figure 6)
as well as in light density within partitioned ethnicities. Figure 6 shows ethnic groups where
at least 10% of their territory has been partitioned by borders. Sharp border discontinuities
in rule of law appear in several parts of Africa. For example, in the Botswana and Zimbabwe
border (where the Hiechware, the Subia, and the Tlokwa are partitioned); across the Namibia
and Angola border (where the Ambo are split); in the Egypt and Sudan border (where the
Ababda reside); between Kenya and Somalia (where the Bararetta group resides); or between
Gabon and Congo (where the Duma reside).
17Ü
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T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tn a t i o n a li n s t i t u t i o n sa ﬀect regional development, one should ﬁnd that
the part of the same ethnic group that belongs to the high institutional quality country would
outperform economically the adjacent region of the historical homeland of the same ethnicity
that falls into the country with the relatively worse national institutions.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design Before investigating whether
there are systematic diﬀerences in comparative development within tribal regions partitioned
by national boundaries it is necessary to check the validity of the regression discontinuity design.
The RD design requires that all relevant factors besides the treatment -national institutions in
our application- vary smoothly at the border. Our focus on partitions of the same ethnic group
(with the inclusion of ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects) allows us to account for cultural, religious, and
other hard-to-measure tribe-speciﬁc traits. Yet a concern is that the geography or historical
development of partitioned ethnicities in the relatively low institutional quality countries is
systematically diﬀerent from the partitions falling into the relatively high institutional quality
ones. In this case the two (or more) areas of each partitioned ethnicity might not be appropriate
counterfactuals. Thus we examined whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in geographical
and historical characteristics of the (two or more) areas of partitioned ethnicities across the
border.
Table 1-Panel  reports the mean value of variables reﬂecting geography (surface area,
area under water, elevation, suitability for agriculture), the disease environment (malaria sta-
bility index), natural resources (presence of a diamond mine and an oil deposit), and early
18development. Following Nunn and Wantchekon (2009) we proxy pre-colonial development
using an indicator variable of whether a city with population larger than 20000 was in a
country-ethnic region in 1400. We proxy development around independence using population
density in 1960. The units of observation are adjacent areas of partitioned ethnic groups. The
neighboring regions are assigned to either the relatively high or the relatively low institutional
quality country.22 We also report the standard errors of the diﬀerence in means corrected for
spatial correlation.
Table 1− reveals some interesting patterns that support our RD design. First, there are
no systematic diﬀerences in geography, the disease environment, and natural resources across
the border. Second, there is no statistical diﬀerence in population density at independence
across adjacent partitions of the same ethnic group. In a Malthusian regime where richer areas
are more densely populated, this implies that there were no systematic diﬀerences in economic
performance within split ethnicities whose partitions following independence would come to
be subject to diﬀerent national level institutions. Likewise, there are no diﬀerences in the
proxy measure of early development (major city in 1400). Third, the only covariate that is
signiﬁcantly correlated with the treatment is distance from the capital city. Partitions falling
in the relatively high rule of law countries appear to be closer to the capital city of the country.
This correlation is driven by Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, two of the largest
in terms of size countries in Africa that also score very low in institutional development (see
Hansson and Olsson (2010)). In light of this ﬁnding in the empirical analysis we include the RD
polynomial to control in a ﬂexible way for the location of each partition. Overall, the results
in Table 1 -P a n e l support the claim that national boundaries in Africa were arbitrarily
drawn;23 thus the border analysis oﬀers a quasi-experimental setting for identifying the causal
eﬀect of contemporary national institutions on regional development.24
22For example the region of the Ababda in Sudan is assigned to the group of low institutional quality countries,
while the adjacent region of the Ababda in Egypt is assigned to the group of relatively high institutional quality
countries. Partitioned in more than two countries ethnic groups would appear as having three or more pairs of
adjacent partitions. For example, the Azande, which is split into three countries features 3 pairs of adjacent
partitions: the Sudan-Congo pair, the Sudan-Central African Republic one, and the partitions along the border
of Congo and the Central African Republic.
23The history of the border between Nigeria and Cameroon oﬀers an additional piece of qualitative evidence on
the arbitrariness of the colonial border design. Although the overwhelming majority of the borders in Africa did
not change following independence, the border separating Nigeria and Cameroon was redrawn in 1961 following
a UN-sponsored referendum involving the local communities. Perhaps not surprisingly, our identiﬁcation of
partitioned groups reveals no historical homeland to be signiﬁcantly impacted by this locally engineered border
segment (Figure 6).
24We also formally examined (running linear probability models, probits, and logits) whether geography, the
disease environment, proxy measures of early development, and ethnic characteristics predict which ethnicities
got partitioned or not. With the exceptions of total area and area under water which entered positively and
signiﬁcantly, none of the other variables correlates with the event of partitioning. Moreover the 
2 of these
speciﬁcations (estimated across the 835 ethnicities) were well below 010.
19Within Ethnicity Results Table 3 presents the results of the within ethnicity spec-
iﬁcations. The cross-sectional estimates in columns (1), (3) and (5) echo the ﬁndings of Table
2. Across partitioned groups, areas falling in countries with higher institutional quality have
systematically higher levels of development. In columns (2), (4) and (6) we add a vector of
ethnicity constants (i.e. estimating (1) with ). The ethnicity ﬁxed eﬀects account for all
hard-to-observe tribe-speciﬁc cultural and institutional factors that aﬀect regional economic
development. The coeﬃcients on rule of law drop dramatically and become statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. The insigniﬁcance is not driven by a decrease in the precision of the
estimated coeﬃcients, since the standard errors remain largely unchanged (if anything in the
Poisson speciﬁcations the standard errors fall). The results are similar when we use the control
of corruption index to measure national institutional development (in columns (5)-(8)). Diﬀer-
ences in light density within ethnicities partitioned by national boundaries cannot be explained
by diﬀerences in national institutions. Note that although the LS estimates on rule of law and
control of corruption without ethnicity ﬁxed eﬀects are not statistically diﬀerent from those
with ethnicity ﬁxed eﬀects, this is not the case for the Poisson estimates where the coeﬃcients
on national institutions are statistically diﬀerent when ethnicity ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced.
Figures 7 and 7 below illustrate the lack of a systematic within ethnicity correlation between
light density and institutional quality at the national level.
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Differences in Rule of Law Within a Country Pair
Unconditional Relationship
Ethnicities Partitioned Across Countries: Does Rule of Law Matter?
Figure 7
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Differences in Corruption Within a Country Pair
Unconditional Relationship
Ethnicities Partitioned Across Countries: Does Corruption Matter?
Figure 7
In light of the results reported in Table 2 that the correlation between rule of law and light
density weakens but remains signiﬁcant when one controls for ethnic institutions, the ﬁndings
in Table 4 suggest that the ethnicity ﬁxed eﬀects capture on the top of the measured tribal
institutions other cultural and unobserved ethnic features. To gauge, for example, how much of
the decline in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimate of rule of law is due to the inclusion of the precolonial
20jurisdictional hierarchy consider the following: In the speciﬁcation of column (1) in Table 3 when
we restrict the estimation on partitioned groups for which information on tribal institutions is
available the Poisson estimate on rule of law is 1158. If we introduce ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects
(column 2-Table 3), then the coeﬃcient drops by 60% (0472) and becomes insigniﬁcant. If
we add the jurisdictional hierarchy index instead, the estimate on rule of law drops by 30%
to 0832 So, from the 60% drop in the magnitude of rule of law that is due to ethnicity ﬁxed
eﬀects almost half of the decline can be ascribed to variation in precolonial ethnic institutions.
4.3 Precolonial Ethnic Institutions and Regional Development
The preliminary results in Table 2 reveal a signiﬁcant association between the complexity
of precolonial political structures and regional development. The correlation between pre-
colonial ethnic institutions and regional development retained signiﬁcance when we controlled
for geography, the disease environment, and urbanization. Yet a concern with the previous
estimates is that the positive correlation between local institutions and regional development is
driven by country-level characteristics, reﬂecting national policies and institutions, or the type
of colonization and the identity of the colonizing power, etc. In Table 4 we thus estimate within
country speciﬁcations associating regional development with pre-colonial ethnic institutions (i.e.
estimating (1) with ).
Jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community level Column (1) reports
estimates on the eﬀect of jurisdictional hierarchy on regional development. The LS (Poisson)
coeﬃcient is 0054 (0476); both estimates are signiﬁcant at the 99% level. The estimates
are only slightly smaller than the analogous unconditional speciﬁcations (reported in Table 2
column (5)), suggesting that common to all ethnicities country factors were not driving the
positive correlation. In columns (2) and (3) we control for geography (with the set of geographic
controls and the RD polynomial) and population density respectively. Column (4) reports the
most restrictive speciﬁcations, where besides including country ﬁxed-eﬀects, we also condition
on population density and geography. Accounting for geographical factors is important as
there is a positive correlation between land suitability for agriculture and ethnic institutional
development (see Fenske (2009)). The coeﬃcient on the jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the
local community level falls, but retains statistical signiﬁcance at standard conﬁdence levels.
T h eL Se s t i m a t e( 0035) implies that regional development decreases by approximately 10%
as one moves from areas where ethnic groups with strong pre-colonial institutions reside (i.e.
have a jurisdictional hierarchy index equal to 3; for example the Luba in Congo), to regions
populated by ethnicities without any statehood experience before colonization (the index equals
0; for example the Songe in Congo). Likewise the Poisson speciﬁcations imply that moving from
21regions populated by stateless societies to ethnic areas with strong precolonial institutions is
associated with a one standard deviation increase in the dependent variable (3∗0155 ' 047).
Political centralization For comparability with Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007)
and Nunn (2008) in columns (5) to (8) we use an alternative indicator of pre-colonial insti-
tutions, based on the jurisdictional hierarchy index. Following these authors, we construct a
dummy variable of pre-colonial political centralization (statehood) that takes the value of zero
when Murdock’s jurisdictional hierarchy indicates that the tribe lacks a centralized political
organization or is part of a small chiefdom and 1 otherwise. Experimenting with the re-scaled
index is also useful, because the aggregation might account for measurement error in the ju-
risdictional hierarchy (we formally examine the implications of measurement error in the next
section). The within-country coeﬃcient on the political centralization indicator variable in
column (5) is positive and signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels. The estimate retains sig-
niﬁcance, when we control for geography (in (6)), current levels of urbanization (in (7)) or both
(in (8)). These results crucially advance the novel ﬁndings of Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), by
showing that even when one accounts for regional geographical endowments and country ﬁxed-
eﬀects, the correlation between pre-colonial political centralization and regional development
remains strong. The estimates are supportive to Herbst’s (2000) and Olson’s (1987) conjecture
on the importance of pre-colonial political institutions in the process of African development.25
Moreover, these results are in line with the cross-country evidence of Bockstette, Chanda, and
Putterman (2002) on the role of state antiquity and statehood experience on contemporary
development.
Class stratiﬁcation In columns (9)-(12) we report speciﬁcations using Murdock’s
(1967) class stratiﬁcation index. While our focus is not on the role of the social structure per
se, we use the class stratiﬁcation index as a proxy for the presence and protection of property
rights. Studies in sociology and anthropology document a strong correlation between ethnic
class stratiﬁcation and property rights protection, as well as strong political centralization (e.g.
Rudmin (1995)). Indeed in our sample the class stratiﬁcation index is strongly correlated with
the jurisdictional hierarchy measure (063). The main explanation is that in weakly institution-
alized societies economic inequality can lead to some form of property rights protection, as the
elite has the incentive to establish constraints on the executive and against expropriation from
25To further examine the impact of precolonial local institutions, we estimated speciﬁcations with four indicator
variables that take on the value one when the jurisdictional hierarchy index takes the value 1, 2, 3,a n d4
respectively and zero otherwise (the omitted category consists of stateless societies). In line with the results
of Table 4 the unrestricted speciﬁcations with the four indicator variables show that the higher the degree of
pre-colonial centralization the higher light density is today.
22the masses (see Bates (1981)). In the same spirit Acemoglu, Bautista, Querubin, and Robin-
son (2008) argue that economic inequality might be conducive to development by constraining
distortionary policies (such as expropriation), while Goldstein and Udry (2008) show a positive
link between political power inside the local community (class stratiﬁcation) and land tenure
(property rights) in rural Gambian communities.
The coeﬃcient on the class stratiﬁcation index is positive and highly signiﬁcant across
all permutations. The LS estimate in column (12) implies that a movement of the index from
communal societies (such as the Chamba in Nigeria where class stratiﬁcation equals 0)t o
highly complex stratiﬁed societies (such as the Yoruba in Nigeria where the index equals 4)i s
associated with a 10% increase in regional development. The Poisson estimates imply that a
2 point increase in the class stratiﬁcation index increases light density by one standard devi-
ation. The positive association between class stratiﬁcation and regional development, though
surprising at ﬁrst glance, is in line with recent works in Latin America. For example, Ace-
moglu, Bautista, Querubin, and Robinson (2008) and Naritomi, Soares, and Assunção (2009)
document a signiﬁcant positive cross-regional correlation between historical economic inequal-
ity and current development in Colombia and Brazil respectively. The positive within country
eﬀect of early class stratiﬁcation on development is also in line with Dell’s (2009) novel ﬁnding
that the early concentration of large rural estates (the "haciendas"), in regions not aﬀected by
the colonial forced mining labor system in Peru ("the mita"), is associated with better public
goods provision today.
The evidence in Table 4 suggests that tribal characteristics associated with the pre-
colonial institutional arrangements and societal structure exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect on contem-
porary regional economic outcomes. Given that these ethnicity-speciﬁc characteristics remain
robust to the inclusion of a host of correlates at a very ﬁne level and country-speciﬁc unob-




African scholars and anecdotal evidence suggest that national boundaries across Africa are
poorly enforced; this is due to poor demarcation, geographic conditions (desert areas in the
North; rainforest in Central Africa), lack of border patrolling, and because African leaders do
not bother when people move across the national borders. This poses a threat to our iden-
tiﬁcation strategy regarding the eﬀect of the national institutions. To the extent that people
migrate to take advantage of higher incomes in regions with higher levels of institutional qual-
23ity, mobility across national boundaries may attenuate income diﬀerences across the border.
F u r t h e r m o r e ,t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tm o b i l i t yb a r riers are much lower within the same ethnicity
compared to moving across areas of diﬀerent ethnic groups, once we focus within partitions
of the same ethnic group, then the ease of mobility would further attenuate any diﬀerences in
regional development per capita caused by changes in the national level institutions. This sce-
nario predicts that if institutions matter then as a result of the migration towards the partitions
located in the high institutional quality country, population density should be systematically
higher in the latter.
Although in many of the speciﬁcations in Table 3 we control for population density, we
explore in detail this hypothesis. Table 5 reports speciﬁcations with log population density as
the dependent variable. As the variable is normally distributed, we only report LS estimates.
There is no systematic association between national institutions and population density in
areas of partitioned ethnicities. This suggests that the insigniﬁcant within ethnicity relationship
between country-level institutions and regional development is not driven by migration towards
the partition located in the country with better functioning national institutions. Moreover,
to the extent that population density reﬂects (to some degree at least) regional development,
the insigniﬁcant within ethnicity coeﬃcient on rule of law and corruption in columns (2), (3),
(5), and (6) in Table 5 provides additional evidence that national level institutions are not
systematically related to regional economic performance.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks
We performed many robustness checks to investigate the stability of the patterns shown in
Tables 3 and 4. Table 6 summarizes the main sensitivity checks. For brevity, we report
results proxying national institutions with the rule of law index and proxying pre-colonial
ethnic institutions with the binary political centralization index.
Sub-Saharan Africa only Columns (1)-(4) report estimates excluding North Africa
from the analysis to account for the diﬀerent timing and type of colonization in Sub-Saharan
countries as compared to North Africa. The Europeans had established relationships from the
ancient times with North Africa, while contacts with most Sub-Saharan regions were limited
till mid 19th century. Column (1) reveals a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between rule
of law and regional development. The coeﬃcient is quite similar to the estimate in the full
sample (see column (1) - Table 3). Yet once we include ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects, the coeﬃcient
on rule of law declines by 70% and becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. Columns
(3)-(4) report cross-sectional and within-country estimates exploring the eﬀect of precolonial
ethnic institutions on regional development in Sub-Saharan countries. There is a strong positive
24correlation between pre-colonial political centralization and regional development, even when
we include country ﬁxed-eﬀects and control for geography at a very ﬁne level.
Large diﬀerences in institutional quality O n em a ya r g u et h a tt h el a c ko fw i t h i n
ethnicity (across the border) correlation between institutions and regional development is driven
by the small diﬀerences in institutional quality among African countries. We thus repeated
estimation adding squares and higher polynomial terms of the institutional quality indicators
searching for nonlinearities, without detecting any signiﬁcance. In columns (5)-(6) we report
speciﬁcations estimated for two-way partitioned ethnic groups residing across country pairs
with large (deﬁned as higher than the median) diﬀerences in rule of law. Examples of ethnic
groups partitioned between countries with large diﬀerences in institutional quality are present in
many parts of Africa, including, among others, the Tabwa at the border of Congo with Zambia,
the Suri between Ethiopia and Sudan, the Seke between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, and
the Nafana between Ivory Coast and Ghana. While the cross-sectional correlation between rule
of law and light density is positive and signiﬁcant, the correlation weakens considerably and
becomes insigniﬁcant when we include ethnicity ﬁxed-eﬀects.
Additional Controls Although we control for geographical and ecological features
at a very ﬁne level, one may still argue that some other variable is driving the results. In
columns (7)-(10) we include additional controls in an eﬀort to mitigate concerns related to
omitted variables bias. To account for the potential negative eﬀect of natural resources on
development (via spurring conﬂict for example), we augment the speciﬁcation with indicator
variables that take on the value one when a diamond mine or an oil/gas ﬁeld is in the (country-
ethnicity) area and zero otherwise. We also control for the pre-colonial level of urbanization,
including a dummy variable that takes on the value one when a city with a population larger
than 20000 in 1400 was in a tribal area. Additionally, to make sure that the estimates on
precolonial institutions are not driven by diﬀerences in historical tribal levels of development we
controlled for the pre-colonial settlement pattern of each ethnic group as recorded by Murdock
(1967). The classiﬁcation ranges from fully nomadic ethnic groups to groups living in complex
settlements and the categories are listed in order of increasing economic and social development.
Both the pre-colonial settlement pattern and the presence of a historical urban center are
important controls because Bates (1983) argues that political centralization was higher in
densely populated areas. We also include a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for areas
that belong to ethnic groups partitioned by the national border. Columns (7)-(10) present the
results with this augmented set of controls. First, while in the cross-section of ethnicities there
is a strong correlation between rule of law and regional development (in (7)), the correlation
25weakens and turns insigniﬁcant when we focus within ethnicities (in column (8)). Second, the
precolonial centralization index enters with a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃc i e n tb o t hi nt h e
cross-sectional and the within-country estimation. The coeﬃcient is also stable (in both LS
and Poisson), quite similar to the more parsimonious speciﬁcations in Table 4.26
5F u r t h e r E v i d e n c e
5.1 Heterogeneous Eﬀects of National Institutions
Besides perturbing the empirical speciﬁcation to check the sensitivity of our results, we also
searched for potential diﬀerential eﬀects of institutional quality.27
Distance to the Capital City African historians and political scientists (e.g. Herbst
(2000)) have long argued that the European’s presence in Africa with some exceptions was
limited to the coastline and the capital cities. Hence, colonial institutional arrangements,
reﬂected through persistence on today’s institutional quality, would have limited reach far
from the capital cities. Along the same lines, several scholars have argued that due to the
lack of the necessary infrastructure (roads, transportation system) and limited state capacity,
nationwide institutions have minimal impact far from the capital cities (e.g. Dowden (2008)).
To explore this hypothesis we estimated speciﬁcations associating country institutions with
regional development separately for ethnic areas whose partitions are both close to or far from
the capital city (using as a threshold the median distance of the centroid of each ethnic area
from the capital city).
Table 7, columns (1)-(4) report the LS (in Panel ) and Poisson (in Panel )e s t i m a t e s .
The cross-sectional coeﬃcients in (1)-(2) reveal an interesting pattern. While rule of law cor-
relates positively with regional development in ethnic areas both close and far from the capital
city, the estimate is much larger for ethnic areas close to the capital city. The LS coeﬃcient
on rule of law is ten times larger for partitioned ethnicities residing close to the capital city
26The coeﬃcient on the diamond dummy is negative though not always statistically signiﬁcant. The oil
d u m m ye n t e r sw i t hap o s i t i v ea n di nm o s ts p e c i ﬁcations signiﬁcant estimate. While this seems to contradict
the negative cross-country correlation, it is in line with the cross-region results in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2010). The positive correlation between luminosity and oil ﬁeld may also partially reﬂect ﬁres of
oil platforms as captured by the satellite. The unconditional estimate on the city in 1400 indicator is positive
and signiﬁcant suggesting that contemporary regional development is much higher in areas where a major city
was before colonization. Yet the coeﬃcient turns insigniﬁcant when we include the regression discontinuity
polynomial or/and other geography control variables. The partitioned indicator enters with a negative estimate
that in some model permutations is statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, the settlement pattern enters positively, but
does not attain signiﬁcance at conventional levels.
27We also searched for potential interactions between national and ethnic institutions, without however detect-
ing anything signiﬁcant. Similarly, we interacted pre-colonial institutions with proxy measures of state capacity
(e.g. Acemoglu (2005); Besley and Persson (2008)), such as tax revenues as a share of GDP and income tax
receipts as a share of GDP, without however uncovering any robust patterns.
26compared to those located far from it (021 and 002 respectively).28 This ﬁnding is interesting
in light of works on optimal country size (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore (2003)) and the emerging
literature on state capacity (e.g. Acemoglu (2005); Besley and Persson (2008, 2010)).29 Yet this
diﬀerence as well as the coeﬃcient estimates for both types of partitioned ethnic groups drop
to zero when we exploit the within-ethnicity variation, thus replicating the pattern uncovered
in Table 3.
Border Artiﬁciality Inﬂuential scholars argue that colonization had a devastating
long-run impact in Africa and other parts of the world because the political boundaries de-
signed by Europeans partitioned ethnicities destroying the pre-existing social infrastructure
(e.g. Dowden (2008); Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2010); Englebert, Tarango, and Carter
(2002)). In Table 7 columns (5)-(8) we examine whether there is a diﬀerential eﬀect of nation-
wide institutions on regional development depending on whether the partitioned ethnicities are
separated by borders that are more likely to be natural as compared to boundaries that are
more likely to be artiﬁcial. We diﬀerentiate between national boundaries using information
on whether there are signiﬁcant geographic barriers. We classify borders being natural where
the terrain (across a 5 kilometer buﬀer zone from the border line) is either highly rugged or
contains water barriers or is dominated by desert. The cross-sectional estimates in (5)-(6) show
that the correlation between institutional quality and local development is somewhat stronger
across ethnic areas partitioned by natural borders as compared to tribal areas partitioned by
national borders that are more likely to be artiﬁcial. Nevertheless, when we include ethnicity
ﬁxed-eﬀects the within ethnic group correlation between rule of law and regional development
becomes insigniﬁcant for both types of borders.
5.2 Measurement Error in Precolonial Ethnic Institutions
The signiﬁcant eﬀect of pre-colonial ethnic institutions and class stratiﬁcation on regional
development is striking not only because it does not seem to be driven by geography, natural
resources, endowments, and country unobservables, but because the underlying data almost
certainly contain signiﬁcant measurement error. While the compilation of the data was a
life-long project for George Peter Murdock that involved ﬁeld work and extensive research,
28This diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level. In the previous version of the
paper we obtained similar results by adding an interaction term between distance to the capital city and the rule
of law index. The interaction term entered with a signiﬁcantly negative estimate, suggesting that the correlation
of rule of law index and local development decays for regions further away from the capital city.
29Measurement error in the institutional quality index may also explain the much weaker correlation between
rule of law and regional development in areas far from the capital. Since most institutional variables are measured
in the capital cities capturing the rules governing activities of the formal economy, they might not reﬂect very
precisely the institutional features in rural areas that depend on agriculture and the underground economy
(Pande and Udry (2006)).
27given the limited resources and the nature of the endeavor, measurement error is most likely
present. Since there is no a priori reason to expect that Murdock misclassiﬁed the institutional
traits of ethnicities in a systematic way, our estimates are most likely attenuated. Although
classical error-in-variables produces conservative estimates, it is intriguing to try to account
for measurement error. We thus combine the two mismeasured proxies of precolonial local
institutional in a 2SLS empirical framework, since under error orthogonality this approach
yields unbiased estimates (Wooldridge (2002)).30
Table 8 reports country ﬁxed-eﬀects 2SLS speciﬁcations. To be conservative in all em-
pirical models we include population density, the RD polynomial, and the standard set of
geographic/ecological controls. For the speciﬁcations in columns (1) and (2) we use class strat-
iﬁcation as an "instrument" for the jurisdictional hierarchy index and the political centraliza-
tion index respectively. Reversely in column (3) we use the jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the
local community level as an "instrument" for ethnic class stratiﬁcation. Panel  illustrates
the strong positive correlation (ﬁrst-stage ﬁt) between these proxy measures of pre-colonial
institutions (the F-score of excluded instrument exceeds 70 in all speciﬁcations). Panel  re-
ports the 2SLS estimates, while Panel  presents for comparability the corresponding OLS
estimates. All three proxy measures of pre-colonial institutions enter the second stage with
highly signiﬁcant estimates. Moreover, in all speciﬁcations the 2SLS estimates are larger than
the analogous LS estimates, suggesting that our previous estimates were conservative due to
attenuation. The 2SLS coeﬃcient on the jurisdictional hierarchy index (0055)i s70% higher
than the LS estimate (0033), while the 2SLS coeﬃcient on the political centralization index
(0117) is almost two times larger than the LS estimate (0066). Likewise the 2SLS coeﬃcient
on class stratiﬁcation (0037)i sa l s os i g n i ﬁcantly larger than the LS estimate (0021).
Table 8 columns (4)-(6) report 2SLS estimates associating log light density and pre-
colonial ethnic institutions in areas where there is at least some light. Focusing on the intensive
margin of light density is useful because it guarantees that we focus on areas with considerable
economic activity. Moreover when we ignore unlit areas log light density is normally distributed
and thus linear models are appropriate. The LS estimates (in Panel ) suggest that, conditional
on the area being lit, regional development is signiﬁcantly higher in areas where ethnicities with
complex political institutions and societal structure reside. Similar to the pattern found for
the maximum sample (in columns (1)-(3)), the 2SLS coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly larger than
the corresponding LS estimates suggesting that measurement error was producing attenuated
30To account for measurement error, we also run regressions using the principal component of the jurisdictional
hierarchy and the class stratiﬁcation index. The principal component that reﬂects the pre-existing complexity of
the society enters in all permutations with a highly signiﬁcant estimate implying larger eﬀects than the estimates
in Table 4.
28estimates. While the 2SLS speciﬁcations might still not uncover the true eﬀect (because the
errors in the variables are correlated), they clearly suggest that if anything the eﬀect of pre-
colonial institutional traits on contemporary African development established in the previous
Tables is quantitatively large.
5.3 The Rule of the Divided
Our ﬁnding that within partitioned ethnicities national level institutions do not explain diﬀer-
ences in economic performance raises the question on whether these are just unruly areas or
there is some other local institutional arrangement that shapes economic performance. Table 9
reports within country speciﬁcations examining the impact of ethnic institutional structures in
regions of partitioned ethnic groups.31 For completeness we report results with all three proxies
of early ethnic-speciﬁc institutional traits. The coeﬃcient on the jurisdictional hierarchy be-
yond the local community level in columns (1)-(2) is positive and highly signiﬁcant. We obtain
similar results when we use the binary political centralization index in columns (3)-(4). The LS
estimate when we include all control variables and country ﬁxed-eﬀects implies that regional
economic development is 95% higher in border regions populated by partitioned ethnicities
characterized by hierarchical political centralization. Likewise, the Poisson speciﬁcations reveal
that light density is 075 points (15 standard deviations) higher in border areas of centralized
ethnicities as compared to areas of ethnicities with lack of political centralization. The coeﬃ-
cients for both the political centralization index and the jurisdictional hierarchy measure are
if anything higher than the analogous estimates in the full sample (see Table 4). We obtain
similar -though somewhat weaker- results when we use the class stratiﬁcation index in columns
(5)-(6)). Overall, the evidence suggests that historical ethnicity-speciﬁc institutional traits ex-
ert an important inﬂuence on comparative development across partitioned ethnic groups where
formal countrywide institutions have been shown to lack explanatory power.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We study the role of institutional quality in shaping contemporary comparative development in
Africa focusing both on formal nationwide structures and informal ethnicity-speciﬁc arrange-
ments. We perform our analysis at the regional level utilizing anthropological and historical
data on the spatial distribution and local institutions of the numerous African ethnicities at
the time of colonization. To circumvent data unavailability on regional development in Africa,
we use satellite data on light density at night to measure economic performance across ethnic
31We obtain similar results when we focus on all border groups (i.e. focusing not only on partitioned ethnicities
but also on ethnicities that reside in areas adjacent to the national border).
29areas. Exploiting within-country across-ethnicity variation in ethnic pre-colonial institutions
as well as within ethnicity across-country variation on contemporary country level institutions,
we document new empirical regularities on the role of institutional structures on African de-
velopment.
First, our cross-sectional speciﬁcations reveal a positive correlation between contempora-
neous nationwide institutions and regional development. Yet this correlation does not identify
the one-way eﬀect of the rule of law on development, as there could be other country or local
characteristics that aﬀect both institutional and economic outcomes. To push on the identi-
ﬁcation front, we take advantage of the fact that the arbitrarily drawn political boundaries
across the African landscape partitioned groups in diﬀerent countries, thus subjecting iden-
tical cultures and people to diﬀerent country-level institutions. The analysis uncovers that
diﬀerences in economic performance within ethnic groups partitioned across diﬀerent countries
cannot be explained by countrywide diﬀerences in rule of law or the control of corruption. This
result casts doubt on the causal interpretation of the cross-country positive correlation between
institutional quality and economic development in Africa.
Second, we explore the large heterogeneity in tribal institutions and examine their ef-
fect on regional development. In line with an inﬂuential conjecture among African scholars
and historians, we show that ethnic pre-colonial institutions still exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
contemporary regional development. The strong within country correlation between ethnic
institutions, i.e. political centralization and class stratiﬁcation, and regional development is
also present along areas populated by ethnic groups partitioned by the national borders. Our
ﬁndings contribute to the literature on the role of contemporary and historical determinants
of economic development and suggest that in Africa the relevant unit of analysis is the ethnic
group rather than the country.
Besides these ﬁndings, our codiﬁcation of partitioned ethnic groups and the combination
of high resolution regional data on development (such as satellite light density at night) with
historical measures on culture and institutions provide a platform for subsequent research. One
could employ our approach to shed light on the perennial debate regarding the fundamental
determinants of comparative economic development across countries, examining for example
the eﬀect of human capital, public policies, and democracy, on economic performance. We
intend to tackle some of these questions in future research.
307 Data Appendix
7.1 Variables at the ethnicity-country level
Light Density at Night: Light Density is calculated at a tribe-country level averaging light
density observations across pixels that fall within the unit of analysis. To smooth weather
variation we use the average of the values in 2007 and 2008.
Source: Available at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/global_composites_v2.html.
Population Density: Log population density per sq. km. in 2000 and in 1960.I n
the regressions we exclude unpopulated areas in 2000. Source: UNESCO (1987). Available at:
http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php.
Area: Log Surface area in 1000 of sq. km. Source: Global Mapping International,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA.
Water Area: Log (1 + total area within an ethnic group district covered by rivers or
lakes in sq. km.). Source: Constructed using the "Inland water area features" dataset from
Global Mapping International, Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry
Mapping System.
Elevation: Average elevation in km. Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA) and U.S. National Geophysical Data Center, TerrainBase, release 1.0 (CD-
ROM), Boulder, Colorado. http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/data.php?incdataset=Topography
Land Suitability for Agriculture: Average land quality for cultivation within the
area of each ethnic-country observation. The index is the product of two components capturing
the climatic and soil suitability for cultivation. Source: Michalopoulos (2008); Original Source:
Atlas of the Biosphere. Available at http://www.sage.wisc.edu/iamdata/grid_data_sel.php.
Malaria Stability Index: The index takes into account the prevalence and type of
mosquitoes indigenous to a region, their human biting rate, their daily survival rate, and their
incubation period. The index has been constructed for 05 degree by 05 degree grid-cells
globally. Source: Kiszewski, Mellinger, Spielman, Malaney, Sachs, and Sachs (2004)
Distance to the Capital City: The geodesic distance of the centroid of each ethnic
group in a country from the capital city of the country it belongs, measured in 1000 of km’s.
Source: Calculated using the Haversine formula.
Sea Distance: The geodesic distance of the centroid of each ethnic group in a country
from the nearest coastline, measured in 1000 of km’s. Source: Global Mapping International,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. Series name: Global Ministry Mapping System. Series
issue: Version 3.0
Petroleum: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if an oil ﬁeld is found
in the region of ethnic group  in country . Source: The Petroleum Dataset v.1.1 contains
31information on all known on-shore oil and gas deposits throughout the world.
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Petroleum-Dataset/Petroleum-
Dataset-v11/
Diamond: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a diamond mine is
found in the region of ethnic group  in country . Source: Map of Diamond Resources.
www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Geographical-and-Resource/Diamond-Resources/
City in 1400: Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a city with a population
larger than 20000 in 1400 was in the area of ethnic group  in country . Source: Chandler
(1987).
Split: Indicator variable that equals 1 if at least 10% of the historical homeland of an
ethnic group is partitioned into diﬀerent countries. Source: Calculated intersecting Murdock’s
(1959) ethnic map of Africa with the Digital Chart of the World (DCW) shapeﬁle. The latter
contains the polygons delineating the international boundaries in 1992.
7.2 Country-level variables
Rule of Law: The index is "capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁ-
dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." The
standardized index ranges from −25 to +25 with higher values indicating better functioning
institutions. Source: World Bank Governance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufman, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi (2005)). available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
Corruption: Index on the control of corruption "capturing perceptions of the extent
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests." The standardized
index ranges from −25 to +25 with lower values indicating a higher degree of corruption.
Source: World Bank Governance Matters Indicators Database (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2005)). available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
7.3 Pre-Colonial Ethnicity-level variables
Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local Community: Ordered variable ranging from 0
to 4 indicating the number of jurisdictional levels (political complexity) in each society above
the local level. A 0 indicates stateless societies, 1 and 2 indicate petty and large paramount
chiefdoms (or their equivalent), 3 and 4 indicate large states. Since we have only 3 ethnicities
where the index equals 4 we assign to these ethnicities a score of 3. Source: Murdock (1967);
variable code in the Entholinguistic Atlas v32; A revised version of Murdock’s Atlas has been
32made available by J. Patrick Gray at:
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/~drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
Centralization Indicator: This binary index takes the value 0 if the Jurisdictional
Hierarchy beyond Local Community variable equals 0 or 1. The index takes on the value 1 if the
Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community variable equals 2,3,a n d4. This aggregation
follows Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007). Source: Murdock (1967).
Class Stratiﬁcation: Ordered variable ranging from 0 to 4 quantifying "t h ed e g r e eo f
class diﬀerentiation, excluding purely political and religious statuses". A zero score indicates
"absence of signiﬁcant class distinctions among freemen, ignoring variations in individual re-
pute achieved through skill, valor, piety, or wisdom."As c o r eo f1 indicates "the presence
of wealth distinctions, based on possession or distribution of property, which however have not
crystallized into distinct and hereditary social classes."As c o r eo f2 indicates "elite stratiﬁcation
in which an elite class derives its superior status from control over scarce resources, particularly
land, and is thereby diﬀerentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class". A score of 3
indicates a "dual stratiﬁcation into a hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary com-
moners or freemen, where traditionally ascribed noble status is at least as decisive as control
over scarce resources. As c o r eo f4 indicates "complex stratiﬁcation into social classes corre-
lated in large measure with extensive diﬀerentiation of occupational statuses." Source: Murdock
(1967); variable code in the Ethnolinguistic Atlas v67.
Settlement Pattern: Ordered variable ranging from 1 to 8 quantifying "settlement
pattern of each group". Score 1 indicates fully nomadic (migratory) groups, 2 semi-nomadic,
3 semi-sedentary, 4 groups that live in compact and impermanent settlements, 5 for societies
those in neighborhoods of dispersed family homes, 6 for groups in separated hamlets forming
as i n g l ec o m m u n i t y ,7 in compact and relatively permanent settlements, and 8 are the groups
residing in complex settlements. Source: Murdock (1967); variable code in the Ethnolinguistic
Atlas v30.
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39variable Obs. mean st. dev. p25 median p75 min max
Light Density 1218 0.198 0.521 0.000 0.018 0.126 0.000 4.653
Ln (1 + Light Density) 1218 0.131 0.271 0.000 0.017 0.119 0.000 1.732
Ln(Light Density) 862 -2.956 2.056 -4.255 -2.930 -1.542 -10.431 1.537
Rule of Law 1218 -0.851 0.583 -1.266 -0.888 -0.464 -1.912 0.708
Control of Corruption 1218 -0.776 0.494 -1.048 -0.873 -0.468 -1.590 0.722
Ln(Population Density) 1218 2.732 1.789 1.831 3.004 3.957 -6.673 6.219
Distance from the Capital City 1218 0.629 0.623 0.265 0.426 0.715 0.010 3.174
Distance from the Sea 1218 0.654 0.442 0.264 0.610 0.973 0.005 1.805
Ln(Area) 1218 1.946 1.721 0.940 2.090 3.122 -4.032 6.202
Ln(Water Area) 1218 0.262 0.424 0.003 0.091 0.323 0.000 3.119
Mean Elevation 1218 0.627 0.438 0.298 0.493 0.958 0.000 2.181
Land Suitability For Agriculture 1218 0.409 0.239 0.254 0.424 0.572 0.001 0.979
Malaria Stability Index 1218 0.732 0.334 0.525 0.894 1.000 0.000 1.000
Diamond Mine Indicator 1218 0.091 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Major City in 1400 AD Inidcator 1218 0.020 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Oil Deposit Indicator 1218 0.072 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Split Indicator 1218 0.424 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Jurisdictional Hierarchy  669 1.196 0.950 0.000 1.000 2.000 0.000 3.000
Political Centralization 669 0.356 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Class Stratification 591 1.359 1.417 0.000 1.000 3.000 0.000 4.000
Table 1  - Panel A: Summary Statistics
The Table reports descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the empirical analysis. The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources.High Rule of Law Low Rule of Law Standard Error
Malaria Stability 0.747 0.747 [0.009]
Elevation 640.606 624.632 [12.316]
Land Area 19.784 19.811 [2.198]
Water Area 0.487 0.420 [0.058]
Suitability for Agriculture 0.408 0.400 [0.008]
Distance from the Capital City 0.479 0.744 [0.082]***
Distance from the Sea 0.664 0.657 [0.008]
Diamond Mine Indicator 0.107 0.104 [0.023]
Oil/Petroleum Deposit Indicator 0.062 0.032 [0.019]
Population Density in 1960 15.159 14.163 [1.723]
Major City in 1400 AD Indicator 0.016 0.019 [0.007]
Observations 309 309
Partitioned Ethnic Group Areas
Table 1  - Panel B: Regression Discontinuity Design
The unit of observation is adjacent partitions of ethnic groups divided by national boundaries. Standard errors for the 
difference in means in brackets are double clustered at the common border and ethnic-group dimension. Standard 
errors for the difference in means in parentheses are clustered at the country each partition belongs to. The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Rule of Law 0.1105** 0.1076** 0.1316*** 0.1046** 0.1240** 0.1224** 0.1431** 0.1188** 
 (0.0470)  (0.0509)  (0.0499)  (0.0418)  (0.0518)  (0.0618)  (0.0582)  (0.0523)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.0675*** 0.0601*** 0.0558** 0.0457** 0.0579*** 0.0529*** 0.0451** 0.0406** 
 (0.0257)  (0.0219)  (0.0231)  (0.0179)  (0.0213)  (0.0190)  (0.0188)  (0.0163)
adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.185 0.238 0.295 0.053 0.200 0.245 0.311 0.112 0.246 0.301 0.348
Rule of Law 0.8606*** 0.8071*** 0.9747*** 0.7330** 0.9983*** 0.7921** 0.8413*** 0.7621***
 (0.2125)  (0.3462)  (0.3297)  (0.2918)  (0.2250)  (0.3745)  (0.2397)  (0.2527)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.5386*** 0.4664*** 0.3950*** 0.3039*** 0.4414*** 0.3779*** 0.3017*** 0.2470** 
 (0.1424)  (0.1338)  (0.1367)  (0.1109)  (0.1262)  (0.1203)  (0.1168)  (0.1041)
Log Likelihood -625.91 -541.34 -499.52 -458.61 -365.62 -310.92 -287.06 -271.47 -343.00 -297.38 -274.36 -261.88
RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Population Density No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 1218 1218 1218 1218 672 672 672 672 669 669 669 669
Table 2 - Preliminary Evidence: 
National Contemporary Institutions, Precolonial Local Ethnic-Specific Institutions, and Regional Development 
National Contemporary Institutions Ethnicity-specific Pre-Colonial Institutions National and Ethnic Institutions
Panel A reports OLS estimates and Panel B reports Poisson ML estimates associating regional development with contemporary national institutions (in columns (1)-(4), (9)-(12)) and pre-
colonial ethnic institutions (in columns (5)-(12)). The dependent variable is light density at night from satellite at the ethnicity-country level. In the OLS specifications satellite light density 
at night is expressed in logs, while in the Poisson estimates satellite light density at night is expressed in levels. The proxy for contemporary national institutions is World Bank’s 
Governance Matters rule of law index. The proxy for pre-colonial ethnic institutions is Murdock’s (1967) index of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community level before 
colonization. The regression discontinuity (RD) polynomial in columns (2)-(4), (6)-(8), and (10)-(12) is a cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area from 
the capital city of each country and distance from the closest sea coast. The specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), and (12) also include the log population density. The set of 
geographic controls included in columns (4), (8) and (12), include log surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), land suitability for agriculture, elevation, and a 
malaria stability index. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-
dimension and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Panel A: OLS 
Panel B: Poisson ML(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Rule of Law 0.0939* 0.0241 0.1132** 0.0251 0.0932** 0.0246
 (0.0497)  (0.0517)  (0.0502)  (0.0469)  (0.0457)  (0.0497)
Control of Corruption 0.0985 0.0384 0.1233** 0.0445 0.0990* 0.0431
 (0.0635)  (0.0703)  (0.0629)  (0.0644)  (0.0585)  (0.0741)
adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.684 0.21 0.721 0.249 0.725 0.161 0.685 0.204 0.722 0.245 0.726
within R-squared __ 0.0566 __ 0.1661 __ 0.179 __ 0.0586 __ 0.1695 __ 0.1819
Rule of Law 0.8780** -0.0187 1.0575** 0.1850 0.8362* 0.066
 (0.4309)  (0.3164)  (0.5232)  (0.1903)  (0.4449)  (0.1941)
Control of Corruption 0.9277** 0.0864 1.2114** 0.2282 0.9339** 0.0888
 (0.4702)  (0.4239)  (0.5063)  (0.1947)  (0.4389)  (0.2137)
Log Likelihood -625.91 -542.52 -499.52 -458.61 -365.62 -328.10 -192.58 -124.80 -177.38 -113.74 -164.08 -113.15
Ethnicity Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
RD Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Density No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503 503
Panel A: OLS 
Panel B: Poisson ML
Table 3: Contemporary National Institutions and Regional Development across and within Partitioned Ethnic Groups
Panel A reports OLS estimates and Panel B reports Poisson ML estimates associating regional development with contemporary national institutions as proxied by a rule of law index (in 
columns (1)-(6)) and a control of corruption index (in columns (7)-(12)) in areas of partitioned ethnicities. The dependent variable is light density at night from satellite at the ethnicity-
country level. In the OLS specifications satellite light density at night is expressed in logs, while in the Poisson estimates satellite light density at night is expressed in levels. Odd-numbered 
specifications report cross-sectional estimates. Even-numbered specifications report within-country estimates. The specifications in even-numbered columns include a set of ethnicity fixed-
effects (constants not reported).  In all specifications we include a regression discontinuity (RD) cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area from the capital 
city of each country and distance from the closest sea coast. The specifications in columns (3)-(6) and (9)-(12) also include the log population density. The set of geographic controls 
included in columns (4), (6), (11), and (12) include log surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), land suitability for agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability 
index. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the 
ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ethnic Institutions 0.0538*** 0.0434*** 0.0419*** 0.0352*** 0.0878*** 0.0813*** 0.0707*** 0.0658*** 0.0251** 0.0210** 0.0308*** 0.0250** 
 (0.0182)  (0.0166)  (0.0143)  (0.0135)  (0.0310)  (0.0287)  (0.0233)  (0.0224)  (0.0099)  (0.0088)  (0.0109)  (0.0107)
               
adjusted R-squared 0.418 0.557 0.519 0.607 0.410 0.555 0.515 0.606 0.550 0.645 0.436 0.578
within R-squared 0.044 0.271 0.209 0.354 0.030 0.269 0.202 0.353 0.228 0.391 0.033 0.276
Ethnic Institutions 0.4767*** 0.2670*** 0.2140** 0.1545* 0.7546*** 0.5228** 0.4530** 0.3705** 0.1706*** 0.1557*** 0.2613*** 0.2103***
 (0.0999)  (0.1029)  (0.0972)  (0.0804)  (0.2157)  (0.2028)  (0.1776)  (0.1444)  (0.0499)  (0.0270)  (0.0655)  (0.0485)
Log Likelihood -271.37 -233.46 -229.12 -213.82 -275.44 -233.39 -228.80 -213.29 -246.47 -206.73 -201.44 -185.92
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RD Polynomial No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Population Density No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 672 593 593 593 593
Class Stratification
Panel A reports country fixed-effects OLS estimates and Panel B reports country fixed-effects Poisson ML estimates associating regional development with pre-colonial ethnic institutions. 
The dependent variable is light density at night from satellite at the ethnicity-country level. In the OLS specifications satellite light density at night is expressed in logs, while in the Poisson 
estimates satellite light density at night is expressed in levels. In columns (1)-(4) we measure pre-colonial ethnic institutions using Murdock’s (1967) index of jurisdictional hierarchy 
beyond the local level. In columns (5)-(8) we use the binary (0-1) Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) political centralization index that is based on Murdock’s (1967) jurisdictional 
hierarchy beyond the local level. In columns (9)-(12) we use Murdock’s (1967) class stratification index. All specifications include a set of country fixed-effects (constants not reported).  In 
even-numbered specifications we include a regression discontinuity (RD) cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area from the capital city of each country 
and distance from the closest sea coast and a set of geographic controls.  The set of geographic controls includes log surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), 
land suitability for agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability index.  The specifications in columns (3), (4), (7), (8), (11), and (12) also include the log population density. The Data 
Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic 
family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table 4: Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Regional Development within African Countries
Jurisdictional Hierarchy Political Centralization
Panel A: OLS 
Panel B: Poisson ML(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of Law -0.3244 0.0744 0.0069
(0.4245) (0.2767) (0.3107)
Control of Corruption -0.4227 0.0195 -0.0965
(0.4928) (0.3357) (0.3722)
adjusted overall R-squared 0.012 0.801 0.829 0.014 0.801 0.830
within R-squared __ 0.006 0.029 __ 0.001 0.026
Ethnicity Fixed-Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
RD Polynomial No No Yes No No Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes No No Yes
observations 503 503 503 503 503 503
The Table reports cross-sectional and within-ethnicity OLS estimates associating regional population density with contemporary 
national institutions, as proxied by a rule of law index (in columns (1)-(3)) and a control of corruption index (in columns (4)-(6)) 
in areas of partitioned ethnicities. The dependent variable is log population density at the ethnicity-country level. Odd-numbered 
specifications report cross-sectional estimates. Even-numbered specifications report within-country estimates. The specifications 
in even-numbered columns include a set of ethnicity fixed-effects (constants not reported).  In the specifications in columns (3) 
and (6) we include a regression discontinuity (RD) cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area 
from the capital city of each country and distance from the closest sea coast and a set of geographic control variables. The set of 
geographic controls includes log surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), land suitability for 
agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability index. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family 
of each tribe dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table 5:  Contemporary National Institutions and Regional Population 
Density across and within Partitioned Ethnicities(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rule of Law 0.1043** 0.0317 0.1694** 0.0617  0.1398*** 0.031
 (0.0485)  (0.0518)  (0.0708)  (0.0728)  (0.0526)  (0.0503)
Political Centralization 0.0797** 0.0605***  0.0902*** 0.0640***
 (0.0387)  (0.0218)  (0.0348)  (0.0216)
adjusted R-squared 0.265 0.710 0.284 0.565 0.431 0.877 0.37 0.73 0.336 0.606
Panel B: Poisson ML
Large Differences in Rule of 
Law Additional Controls
Table 6  -  Sensitivity Analysis: 
National Contemporary Institutions, Precolonial Local Ethnic-Specific Institutions, and Regional Development 
Excluding North Africa
Panel A: OLS 
Rule of Law 1.0169** 0.1557 1.1055*** 0.3526 0.8665*** 0.3028
 (0.4807)  (0.1950)  (0.3737) (0.2738)  (0.2637)  (0.2905)
Political Centralization 0.4214* 0.3045*** 0.5502** 0.3915***
 (0.2470)  (0.0873)  (0.2539)  (0.1498)
Log Likelihood -139.04 -99.83 -174.28 -151.61 -43.48 -34.98 -453.47 -112.91 -271.40 -212.81
Ethnicity Fixed-Effects No Yes No No No Yes No Yes No No
Country Fixed-Effects No No No Yes No No No No No Yes
RD Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 480 480 636 636 160 160 686 503 669 669
Panel B: Poisson MLTable 6 Notes
Panel A reports OLS estimates and Panel B reports Poisson ML estimates associating regional development with contemporary national institutions (in columns (1), (2), (5)-(8)) and 
pre-colonial ethnic institutions (in columns (3), (4), (11), 12)). The dependent variable is light density at night from satellite at the ethnicity-country level. In the OLS specifications 
satellite light density at night is expressed in logs, while in the Poisson estimates satellite light density at night is expressed in levels. The proxy for contemporary national institutions 
is World Bank’s Governance Matters rule of law index. The proxy for pre-colonial ethnic institutions is the Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) binary (0-1) political centralization 
index that is based on Murdock’s (1967) jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level. The specifications in columns (2), (6), and (8) include a set of ethnicity fixed-effects 
(constants not reported). The specifications in columns (4) and (10) include a set of country fixed-effects (constants not reported). In all specifications we include a regression 
discontinuity (RD) cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area from the capital city of each country and distance from the closest sea coast, a set of 
geographic controls, and log population density.  The set of geographic controls includes log surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), land suitability for 
agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability index. Columns (1)-(4) report estimates only in Sub-Saharan countries (excluding North Africa). Columns (5) and (6) focus on ethnicities 
partitioned in 2 countries and report cross-sectional and within-ethnicity results across pairs of countries with large differences in the rule of law index (larger than the median 
difference).  The specifications in column (7)-(10) also include indicator variables on: (i) whether the ethnicity is partitioned by a national border or not, (ii) whether a major city in 
1400 is in the ethnicity’s  historical homeland, (iii) whether a diamond mine is present or not, and (iv) whether an oil/petroleum field is present or not. These specifications also 
include an index of precolonial settlement patterns (ranging from nomadic ethnicities to groups residing in complex settlements). The Data Appendix gives detail variable definitions 
and data sources. In the specifications with country fixed-effects we also report the within country R-squared. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double 
clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.Close Far Close Far Natural Artificial Natural Artificial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rule of Law 0.2055** 0.0215** -0.0127 0.0075 0.1998** 0.0636*** 0.0993 -0.0245
 (0.0845)  (0.0105)  (0.0903)  (0.0237)  (0.0824)  (0.0225)  (0.1243)  (0.0525)
adjusted R-squared 0.505 0.402 0.906 0.825 0.428 0.342 0.877 0.739
within R-squared __ __ 0.307 0.455 __ __ 0.281 0.380
Rule of Law 1.2072*** 0.5277*** 0.3596 0.0911 1.2518*** 1.1261*** 0.2341 -0.4698
(0.4510) (0.1400) (0.2570) (0.3960) (0.5850) (0.2750) (0.4180) (0.4310)
Log Likelihood -32.62 -14.35 -26.19 -11.67 -64.88 -19.08 -48.11 -16.68
RD Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 92 96 92 96 180 126 180 126
Panel A reports OLS estimates and Panel B reports Poisson ML estimates associating regional development with contemporary national 
institutions as proxied by a rule of law in areas of partitioned ethnicities. The dependent variable is light density at night from satellite at 
the ethnicity-country level. In the OLS specifications satellite light density at night is expressed in logs, while in the Poisson estimates 
satellite light density at night is expressed in levels. Odd-numbered specifications report cross-sectional estimates. Even-numbered 
specifications report within ethnicity estimates (ethnicity constants not reported). In all specifications we include a regression 
discontinuity (RD) cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area from the capital city of each country and 
distance from the closest sea coast, a set of geographic controls, and log population density.  The set of geographic controls includes log 
surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), land suitability for agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability 
index.  All specifications focus on ethnicities partitioned in 2 countries (i.e. partitioned ethnic groups in 3 or more countries are 
excluded). In columns (1) and (3) we restrict estimation in areas of partitioned ethnicities that are both close to the capital city (less than 
the median distance). In columns (2) and (4) we restrict estimation in areas of partitioned ethnicities that are both far from the capital 
city (more than the median distance). In columns (5) and (7) we restrict estimation in areas of partitioned ethnicities that are more likely 
to be natural, i.e. separated by significant geographic barriers. In columns (6) and (8) we restrict estimation in areas of partitioned 
ethnicities that are more likely to be artificial (are not separated by significant geographic barriers). The Data Appendix gives detailed 
variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension 
and the ethno-linguistic family dimension. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table 7  - Heterogeneous Effects: 
National Institutions and Regional Development Across and Within Partitioned Ethnicities
Distance to the Capital Border Type
Panel A: OLS
Panel B: Poisson ML(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 0.0554*** 0.4306***
 (0.0198)  (0.1586)
Political Centralization 0.1167*** 0.9013***
 (0.0409)  (0.3204)
Class Stratification 0.0374*** 0.1586*
 (0.0132)  (0.0816)
Instrument Class Strat Class Strat Juris Hier Class Strat Class Strat Juris Hier
coefficient 0.3824 0.1817 0.8766 0.3826 0.1287 0.8358
standard error (0.0408) (0.0215) (0.0758) (0.0400) (0.0209) (0.0917)
First-stage F-score 87.73 [0.00] 71.86 [0.00] 134.88 [0.00] 91.34 [0.00] 76.13 [0.00] 83.06 [0.00]
coefficient 0.0328*** 0.0663*** 0.0212*** 0.1326* 0.2766** 0.1647***
standard error  (0.0125)  (0.0209)  (0.0078)  (0.0730)  (0.1321)  (0.0589)
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RD Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 560 424 424 424
The Table reports country fixed-effects 2SLS estimates associating regional development with pre-colonial ethnic institutions. The 
dependent variable is light density at night from satellite at the ethnicity-country level. In columns (4)-(6) we exclude unlit country-
ethnic areas and focus on the “intensive margin” of luminosity. Panel A gives the estimates of the second stage. Panel B gives the 
estimates of the first-stage. Panel C gives the corresponding OLS estimates.  In columns (1) and (4) we instrument jurisdictional 
hierarchy beyond the local community level with class stratification. In columns (2) and (5) we instrument the binary (0-1) Gennaioli 
and Rainer (2006, 2007) political centralization index with class stratification. In columns (3) and (6) we instrument class stratification 
with the jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community level index. All specifications include a set of country fixed-effects 
(constants not reported).  In all specifications we include a regression discontinuity (RD) cubic polynomial in distance of the centroid of 
each ethnicity-country area from the capital city of each country and distance from the closest sea coast, a set of geographic controls, 
and log population density.  The set of geographic controls includes log surface area, log area under water (lakes, rivers, and other 
streams), land suitability for agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability index.  The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions 
and data sources. The Table also reports the first-stage F-score of the excluded instrument. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family of each tribe dimension. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Panel C: Corresponding OLS
Table 8 : Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Regional Development within African Countries
Measurement Error and Intensive Margin Analysis
All Observations Intensive Margin
Panel A: 2SLS 
Panel B: 1st Stage(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ethnic Institutions 0.0583*** 0.0546*** 0.0905** 0.0954*** 0.0232** 0.0162*
 (0.0186)  (0.0156)  (0.0395)  (0.0333)  (0.0116)  (0.0093)
adjusted R-squared 0.560 0.665 0.551 0.663 0.604 0.711
within R-squared 0.064 0.403 0.043 0.399 0.033 0.426
Ethnic Institutions 0.4067*** 0.2621** 0.9011*** 0.7158*** 0.1845*** 0.1263** 
 (0.1163)  (0.1278)  (0.2296)  (0.2455)  (0.0695)  (0.0560)
               
Log Likelihood -89.76 -83.99 -89.15 -83.45 -80.33 -74.22
Country Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RD Polynomial No Yes No Yes No Yes
Population Density No Yes No Yes No Yes
Geographic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 309 309 309 309 261 261
Panel A reports country fixed-effects OLS estimates and Panel B reports country fixed-effects Poisson ML estimates associating 
regional development with pre-colonial ethnic institutions in areas of partitioned ethnicities. The dependent variable is light density at 
night from satellite at the ethnicity-country level. In the OLS specifications satellite light density at night is expressed in logs, while in 
the Poisson estimates satellite light density at night is expressed in levels. In columns (1) and (2) we measure pre-colonial ethnic 
institutions using Murdock’s (1967) index of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level. In columns (3) and (4) we use the binary 
(0-1) Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007) political centralization index that is based on Murdock’s (1967) jurisdictional hierarchy 
beyond the local level. In columns (5) and (5) we use Murdock’s (1967) class stratification index. All specifications include a set of 
country fixed-effects (constants not reported).  In even-numbered specifications we include a regression discontinuity (RD) cubic 
polynomial in distance of the centroid of each ethnicity-country area from the capital city of each country and distance from the closest 
sea coast, a set of geographic controls, and additional control variables.  The set of geographic controls includes log surface area, log 
area under water (lakes, rivers, and other streams), land suitability for agriculture, elevation, and a malaria stability index.  The set of 
additional control variables includes indicators on: (i) whether the ethnicity is partitioned by a national border or not, (ii) on whether a 
major city in 1400 is in the ethnicity’s  historical homeland, (iii)  whether a diamond mine is present or not, and (iv) whether an 
oil/petroleum field is present or not. These specifications also include an index of precolonial settlement patterns (ranging from 
nomadic ethnicities to groups residing in complex settlements). The specifications in even-numbered columns also include the log 
population density. The Data Appendix gives detailed variable definitions and data sources. Standard errors reported in parentheses 
are adjusted for double clustering at the country-dimension and the ethno-linguistic family of each tribe dimension. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table 9: The Rule of the Divided
Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Regional Development in Partitioned Ethnicities
Panel A: OLS 
Panel B: Poisson ML
Jurisdictional Hierarchy Political Centralization Class StratificationEthnicity Name








ABABDA 0.72 EGY 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.69 TCD 3
ABABDA 0.28 SDN 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.20 CMR 3
ADELE 0.48 GHA 2 LAKA (ADAMAWA) 0.11 CAF 3
ADELE 0.52 TGO 2 LAMBA 0.39 ZAR 2
AFAR 0.17 DJI 3 LAMBA 0.61 ZMB 2
AFAR 0.22 ERI 3 LAMBYA 0.17 MWI 3
AFAR 0.61 ETH 3 LAMBYA 0.33 TZA 3
ALUR 0.16 ZAR 2 LAMBYA 0.50 ZMB 3
ALUR 0.84 UGA 2 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 0.72 GHA 2
AMBA 0.87 ZAR 2 LIGBI, DEGHA (SE) 0.28 CIV 2
AMBA 0.13 UGA 2 LOBI 0.42 CIV 2
AMBO 0.41 AGO 2 LOBI 0.58 BFA 2
AMBO 0.59 NAM 2 LUGBARA 0.45 ZAR 3
AMER 0.56 ERI 2 LUGBARA 0.04 SDN 3
AMER 0.44 SDN 2 LUGBARA 0.51 UGA 3
ANA 0.33 BEN 2 LUNGU 0.31 TZA 2
ANA 0.67 TGO 2 LUNGU 0.69 ZMB 2
ANUAK 0.75 ETH 2 LUVALE 0.81 AGO 3
ANUAK 0.25 SDN 2 LUVALE 0.01 ZAR 3
ANYI 0.42 GHA 2 LUVALE 0.17 ZMB 3
ANYI 0.58 CIV 2 MADI 0.42 SDN 2
ASBEN 0.89 NER 2 MADI 0.58 UGA 2
ASBEN 0.11 DZA 2 MAKONDE 0.56 MOZ 2
ASSINI 0.51 GHA 2 MAKONDE 0.44 TZA 2
ASSINI 0.49 CIV 2 MALINKE 0.03 GMB 6
ATTA 0.51 MAR 2 MALINKE 0.13 CIV 6
ATTA 0.49 DZA 2 MALINKE 0.27 MLI 6
ATYUTI 0.13 GHA 2 MALINKE 0.04 GNB 6
ATYUTI 0.87 TGO 2 MALINKE 0.25 GIN 6
AULLIMINDEN 0.55 MLI 3 MALINKE 0.29 SEN 6
AULLIMINDEN 0.40 NER 3 MAMBILA 0.57 CMR 2
AULLIMINDEN 0.05 DZA 3 MAMBILA 0.43 NGA 2
AUSHI 0.27 ZAR 2 MANDARA 0.35 CMR 2
AUSHI 0.73 ZMB 2 MANDARA 0.65 NGA 2
AVATIME 0.51 GHA 2 MANGA 0.60 NER 2
AVATIME 0.49 TGO 2 MANGA 0.40 NGA 2
AZANDE 0.62 ZAR 3 MANYIKA 0.39 MOZ 2
AZANDE 0.15 CAF 3 MANYIKA 0.61 ZWE 2
AZANDE 0.23 SDN 3 MASAI 0.38 KEN 2
AZJER 0.24 LBY 3 MASAI 0.62 TZA 2
AZJER 0.00 NER 3 MASALIT 0.13 TCD 2
AZJER 0.75 DZA 3 MASALIT 0.87 SDN 2
Appendix Table 1  -  Partitioned Ethnicities and Countries they Belong toBABUKUR 0.82 ZAR 2 MASHI 0.12 AGO 2
BABUKUR 0.18 SDN 2 MASHI 0.88 ZMB 2
BAJUN 0.37 KEN 2 MASINA 0.82 MLI 3
BAJUN 0.63 SOM 2 MASINA 0.09 BFA 3
BALANTE 0.73 GNB 2 MASINA 0.09 MRT 3
BALANTE 0.27 SEN 2 MATAKAM 0.70 CMR 2
BANYUN 0.48 GNB 2 MATAKAM 0.30 NGA 2
BANYUN 0.52 SEN 2 MBERE 0.02 TCD 3
BANZIRI 0.14 ZAR 2 MBERE 0.24 CMR 3
BANZIRI 0.86 CAF 2 MBERE 0.74 CAF 3
BARABRA 0.31 EGY 2 MBUKUSHU 0.74 AGO 3
BARABRA 0.69 SDN 2 MBUKUSHU 0.15 BWA 3
BARARETTA 0.18 ETH 3 MBUKUSHU 0.12 NAM 3
BARARETTA 0.44 KEN 3 MBUNDA 0.89 AGO 2
BARARETTA 0.38 SOM 3 MBUNDA 0.11 ZMB 2
BARGU 0.77 BEN 4 MENDE 0.18 LBR 3
BARGU 0.03 NER 4 MENDE 0.82 SLE 3
BARGU 0.19 NGA 4 MINIANKA 0.01 CIV 3
BARGU 0.02 BFA 4 MINIANKA 0.72 MLI 3
BASHI 0.09 BDI 3 MINIANKA 0.27 BFA 3
BASHI 0.83 ZAR 3 MOMBERA 0.72 MWI 2
BASHI 0.08 RWA 3 MOMBERA 0.28 ZMB 2
BATA 0.29 CMR 2 MPEZENI 0.11 MWI 2
BATA 0.71 NGA 2 MPEZENI 0.89 ZMB 2
BAYA 0.20 CMR 2 MUNDANG 0.80 TCD 2
BAYA 0.80 CAF 2 MUNDANG 0.20 CMR 2
BERABISH 0.80 MLI 2 MUNDU 0.30 ZAR 2
BERABISH 0.20 MRT 2 MUNDU 0.70 SDN 2
BERTA 0.75 ETH 2 MUSGU 0.76 TCD 2
BERTA 0.25 SDN 2 MUSGU 0.24 CMR 2
BIDEYAT 0.21 LBY 4 NAFANA 0.74 GHA 2
BIDEYAT 0.40 TCD 4 NAFANA 0.26 CIV 2
BIDEYAT 0.03 EGY 4 NALU 0.41 GNB 2
BIDEYAT 0.36 SDN 4 NALU 0.59 GIN 2
BIRIFON 0.52 GHA 3 NAMA 0.18 ZAF 2
BIRIFON 0.47 BFA 3 NAMA 0.82 NAM 2
BOBO 0.20 MLI 2 NAUDEBA 0.87 BEN 2
BOBO 0.80 BFA 2 NAUDEBA 0.13 TGO 2
BOKI 0.22 CMR 2 NDAU 0.86 MOZ 2
BOKI 0.78 NGA 2 NDAU 0.14 ZWE 2
BONDJO 0.14 ZAR 2 NDEMBU 0.26 AGO 3
BONDJO 0.86 COG 2 NDEMBU 0.39 ZAR 3
BONI 0.67 KEN 2 NDEMBU 0.35 ZMB 3
BONI 0.33 SOM 2 NDOGO 0.01 ZAR 3
BORAN 0.46 ETH 2 NDOGO 0.18 CAF 3
BORAN 0.54 KEN 2 NDOGO 0.81 SDN 3
BRONG 0.84 GHA 2 NDUKA 0.23 TCD 2
BRONG 0.16 CIV 2 NDUKA 0.77 CAF 2
BUEM 0.40 GHA 2 NGAMA 0.30 TCD 2BUEM 0.60 TGO 2 NGAMA 0.70 CAF 2
BULOM 0.85 SLE 2 NGERE 0.65 CIV 3
BULOM 0.15 GIN 2 NGERE 0.29 LBR 3
BUSA 0.14 BEN 2 NGERE 0.06 GIN 3
BUSA 0.86 NGA 2 NGUMBA 0.65 CMR 2
BWAKA 0.81 ZAR 3 NGUMBA 0.35 GNQ 2
BWAKA 0.15 CAF 3 NGWAKETSE 0.86 BWA 2
BWAKA 0.04 COG 3 NGWAKETSE 0.14 ZAF 2
CHAGA 0.24 KEN 2 NSENGA 0.15 MOZ 3
CHAGA 0.76 TZA 2 NSENGA 0.78 ZMB 3
CHAKOSSI 0.27 GHA 2 NSENGA 0.06 ZWE 3
CHAKOSSI 0.73 TGO 2 NSUNGLI 0.78 CMR 2
CHEWA 0.34 MWI 3 NSUNGLI 0.22 NGA 2
CHEWA 0.50 MOZ 3 NUKWE 0.44 AGO 4
CHEWA 0.16 ZMB 3 NUKWE 0.24 BWA 4
CHIGA 0.12 RWA 3 NUKWE 0.05 ZMB 4
CHIGA 0.87 UGA 3 NUKWE 0.26 NAM 4
CHOKWE 0.81 AGO 2 NUSAN 0.30 BWA 3
CHOKWE 0.19 ZAR 2 NUSAN 0.37 ZAF 3
COMORIANS 0.82 COM 2 NUSAN 0.33 NAM 3
COMORIANS 0.18 MYT 2 NYAKYUSA 0.12 MWI 2
DAGARI 0.67 GHA 2 NYAKYUSA 0.88 TZA 2
DAGARI 0.33 BFA 2 NYANGIYA 0.17 SDN 2
DARI 0.78 TCD 2 NYANGIYA 0.83 UGA 2
DARI 0.22 CMR 2 NYANJA 0.64 MWI 2
DAZA 0.27 TCD 2 NYANJA 0.36 MOZ 2
DAZA 0.73 NER 2 NYASA 0.05 MWI 3
DELIM 0.55 ESH 2 NYASA 0.68 MOZ 3
DELIM 0.45 MRT 2 NYASA 0.27 TZA 3
DENDI 0.60 BEN 3 NZANKARA 0.14 ZAR 2
DENDI 0.39 NER 3 NZANKARA 0.86 CAF 2
DIALONKE 0.36 MLI 3 PANDE 0.38 CAF 2
DIALONKE 0.58 GIN 3 PANDE 0.62 COG 2
DIALONKE 0.06 SEN 3 POPO 0.72 BEN 2
DIDINGA 0.04 KEN 3 POPO 0.28 TGO 2
DIDINGA 0.89 SDN 3 PUKU 0.31 CMR 3
DIDINGA 0.07 UGA 3 PUKU 0.49 GNQ 3
DIGO 0.62 KEN 2 PUKU 0.19 GAB 3
DIGO 0.38 TZA 2 REGEIBAT 0.34 ESH 2
DIOLA 0.14 GMB 3 REGEIBAT 0.66 MRT 2
DIOLA 0.07 GNB 3 RESHIAT 0.83 ETH 3
DIOLA 0.78 SEN 3 RESHIAT 0.06 KEN 3
DUMA 0.63 GAB 2 RESHIAT 0.11 SDN 3
DUMA 0.37 COG 2 RONGA 0.60 MOZ 3
DZEM 0.74 CMR 3 RONGA 0.35 ZAF 3
DZEM 0.03 GAB 3 RONGA 0.05 SWZ 3
DZEM 0.24 COG 3 RUANDA 0.02 BDI 5
EGBA 0.41 BEN 3 RUANDA 0.06 ZAR 5
EGBA 0.52 NGA 3 RUANDA 0.89 RWA 5EGBA 0.07 TGO 3 RUANDA 0.02 TZA 5
EKOI 0.38 CMR 2 RUANDA 0.02 UGA 5
EKOI 0.62 NGA 2 RUNDI 0.76 BDI 4
ESA 0.03 DJI 3 RUNDI 0.04 RWA 4
ESA 0.52 ETH 3 RUNDI 0.20 TZA 4
ESA 0.44 SOM 3 RUNGA 0.74 TCD 3
EWE 0.44 GHA 2 RUNGA 0.26 CAF 3
EWE 0.56 TGO 2 SABEI 0.56 KEN 2
FANG 0.37 CMR 4 SABEI 0.44 UGA 2
FANG 0.07 GNQ 4 SAHO 0.43 ERI 2
FANG 0.54 GAB 4 SAHO 0.57 ETH 2
FANG 0.02 COG 4 SAMO 0.12 MLI 2
FON 0.86 BEN 3 SAMO 0.88 BFA 2
FON 0.14 TGO 3 SANGA 0.26 CMR 3
FOUTADJALON 0.01 MLI 4 SANGA 0.19 CAF 3
FOUTADJALON 0.11 GNB 4 SANGA 0.55 COG 3
FOUTADJALON 0.88 GIN 4 SEKE 0.34 GNQ 2
FOUTADJALON 0.01 SEN 4 SEKE 0.66 GAB 2
FUNGON 0.81 CMR 2 SHAMBALA 0.10 KEN 2
FUNGON 0.19 NGA 2 SHAMBALA 0.90 TZA 2
GADAMES 0.25 LBY 3 SHEBELLE 0.58 ETH 2
GADAMES 0.27 TUN 3 SHEBELLE 0.42 SOM 2
GADAMES 0.48 DZA 3 SHUWA 0.62 TCD 3
GIL 0.80 MAR 2 SHUWA 0.17 CMR 3
GIL 0.20 DZA 2 SHUWA 0.21 NGA 3
GOMANI 0.86 MWI 2 SONGHAI 0.57 MLI 3
GOMANI 0.14 MOZ 2 SONGHAI 0.36 NER 3
GREBO 0.33 CIV 2 SONGHAI 0.07 BFA 3
GREBO 0.67 LBR 2 SONINKE 0.68 MLI 3
GRUNSHI 0.68 GHA 2 SONINKE 0.03 SEN 3
GRUNSHI 0.32 BFA 2 SONINKE 0.29 MRT 3
GUDE 0.83 CMR 2 SOTHO 0.24 LSO 2
GUDE 0.17 NGA 2 SOTHO 0.76 ZAF 2
GULA 0.61 TCD 2 SUBIA 0.11 BWA 4
GULA 0.39 CAF 2 SUBIA 0.53 ZMB 4
GUN 0.48 BEN 2 SUBIA 0.06 ZWE 4
GUN 0.52 NGA 2 SUBIA 0.30 NAM 4
GURENSI 0.74 GHA 3 SUNDI 0.37 ZAR 2
GURENSI 0.13 TGO 3 SUNDI 0.63 COG 2
GURENSI 0.13 BFA 3 SURI 0.71 ETH 2
GURMA 0.15 BEN 4 SURI 0.29 SDN 2
GURMA 0.12 NER 4 SWAZI 0.45 ZAF 2
GURMA 0.01 TGO 4 SWAZI 0.55 SWZ 2
GURMA 0.72 BFA 4 TABWA 0.57 ZAR 2
GUSII 0.53 KEN 2 TABWA 0.43 ZMB 2
GUSII 0.47 TZA 2 TAJAKANT 0.15 MAR 4
HAMAMA 0.80 TUN 2 TAJAKANT 0.14 ESH 4
HAMAMA 0.20 DZA 2 TAJAKANT 0.66 DZA 4
HAUSA 0.14 NER 2 TAJAKANT 0.05 MRT 4HAUSA 0.86 NGA 2 TAMA 0.30 TCD 2
HIECHWARE 0.81 BWA 2 TAMA 0.70 SDN 2
HIECHWARE 0.19 ZWE 2 TAWARA 0.57 MOZ 2
HLENGWE 0.82 MOZ 3 TAWARA 0.43 ZWE 2
HLENGWE 0.00 ZAF 3 TEDA 0.34 LBY 3
HLENGWE 0.18 ZWE 3 TEDA 0.35 TCD 3
HOLO 0.84 AGO 2 TEDA 0.31 NER 3
HOLO 0.16 ZAR 2 TEKE 0.31 ZAR 3
IBIBIO 0.11 CMR 2 TEKE 0.03 GAB 3
IBIBIO 0.89 NGA 2 TEKE 0.66 COG 3
IFORA 0.30 MLI 2 TEKNA 0.53 MAR 2
IFORA 0.70 DZA 2 TEKNA 0.47 ESH 2
IMRAGEN 0.10 MAR 3 TEM 0.17 BEN 2
IMRAGEN 0.74 ESH 3 TEM 0.83 TGO 2
IMRAGEN 0.16 MRT 3 TENDA 0.57 GIN 2
ISHAAK 0.20 ETH 2 TENDA 0.43 SEN 2
ISHAAK 0.80 SOM 2 THONGA 0.58 MOZ 3
IWA 0.33 TZA 2 THONGA 0.42 ZAF 3
IWA 0.67 ZMB 2 TIENGA 0.22 NER 3
JERID 0.90 TUN 2 TIENGA 0.78 NGA 3
JERID 0.10 DZA 2 TIGON 0.32 CMR 2
JIE 0.24 KEN 2 TIGON 0.68 NGA 2
JIE 0.76 UGA 2 TIGRINYA 0.51 ERI 3
KABRE 0.39 BEN 2 TIGRINYA 0.44 ETH 3
KABRE 0.61 TGO 2 TIGRINYA 0.05 SDN 3
KANEMBU 0.73 TCD 3 TLOKWA 0.14 BWA 3
KANEMBU 0.25 NER 3 TLOKWA 0.77 ZAF 3
KANEMBU 0.02 NGA 3 TLOKWA 0.09 ZWE 3
KAONDE 0.21 ZAR 2 TOMA 0.29 LBR 2
KAONDE 0.79 ZMB 2 TOMA 0.71 GIN 2
KAPSIKI 0.65 CMR 2 TONGA 0.84 ZMB 2
KAPSIKI 0.35 NGA 2 TONGA 0.16 ZWE 2
KARA 0.85 CAF 2 TRIBU 0.25 GHA 2
KARA 0.15 SDN 2 TRIBU 0.75 TGO 2
KARAMOJONG 0.27 KEN 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 0.74 LBY 2
KARAMOJONG 0.73 UGA 2 TRIPOLITANIANS 0.26 TUN 2
KARE 0.75 ZAR 2 TUBURI 0.25 TCD 2
KARE 0.25 CAF 2 TUBURI 0.75 CMR 2
KGATLA 0.13 BWA 2 TUKULOR 0.39 SEN 2
KGATLA 0.87 ZAF 2 TUKULOR 0.61 MRT 2
KISSI 0.12 LBR 3 TUMBUKA 0.74 MWI 2
KISSI 0.02 SLE 3 TUMBUKA 0.26 ZMB 2
KISSI 0.86 GIN 3 TUNISIANS 0.87 TUN 2
KOBA 0.89 BWA 2 TUNISIANS 0.13 DZA 2
KOBA 0.11 NAM 2 UDALAN 0.82 MLI 3
KOMA 0.57 ETH 2 UDALAN 0.05 NER 3
KOMA 0.43 SDN 2 UDALAN 0.13 BFA 3
KOMONO 0.49 CIV 2 VAI 0.76 LBR 2
KOMONO 0.51 BFA 2 VAI 0.24 SLE 2KONGO 0.77 AGO 3 VENDA 0.70 ZAF 2
KONGO 0.23 ZAR 3 VENDA 0.30 ZWE 2
KONJO 0.81 ZAR 2 VILI 0.20 AGO 4
KONJO 0.19 UGA 2 VILI 0.22 ZAR 4
KONKOMBA 0.24 GHA 2 VILI 0.11 GAB 4
KONKOMBA 0.76 TGO 2 VILI 0.47 COG 4
KONO 0.74 SLE 2 WAKURA 0.28 CMR 2
KONO 0.26 GIN 2 WAKURA 0.72 NGA 2
KONYANKE 0.30 CIV 2 WANGA 0.79 KEN 2
KONYANKE 0.70 GIN 2 WANGA 0.21 UGA 2
KORANKO 0.39 SLE 2 WUM 0.88 CMR 2
KORANKO 0.61 GIN 2 WUM 0.12 NGA 2
KOTA 0.41 GAB 2 YAKA 0.16 AGO 2
KOTA 0.59 COG 2 YAKA 0.84 ZAR 2
KOTOKO 0.67 TCD 2 YAKOMA 0.40 ZAR 2
KOTOKO 0.33 CMR 2 YAKOMA 0.60 CAF 2
KPELLE 0.48 LBR 3 YALUNKA 0.25 SLE 2
KPELLE 0.52 GIN 3 YALUNKA 0.75 GIN 2
KRAN 0.16 CIV 2 YAO 0.13 MWI 3
KRAN 0.84 LBR 2 YAO 0.65 MOZ 3
KREISH 0.10 CAF 2 YAO 0.22 TZA 3
KREISH 0.90 SDN 2 YOMBE 0.13 AGO 3
KUNDA 0.84 MOZ 3 YOMBE 0.48 ZAR 3
KUNDA 0.15 ZMB 3 YOMBE 0.39 COG 3
KUNG 0.10 BWA 2 ZAGHAWA 0.14 TCD 2
KUNG 0.90 NAM 2 ZAGHAWA 0.86 SDN 2
KUNTA 0.85 MLI 2 ZEKARA 0.83 MAR 2
KUNTA 0.15 DZA 2 ZEKARA 0.17 DZA 2
KWANGARE 0.84 AGO 2 ZIMBA 0.16 MWI 2
KWANGARE 0.16 NAM 2 ZIMBA 0.84 MOZ 2
Appendix Table 1 reports the name of partitioned ethnic groups (as coded by Murdock (1959)) and the percentage of the historical 
homeland of the split ethnic groups that fall into more than one country. Section 2 in the paper gives details on our approach in 
identifying partitioned ethnicities.   